

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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The Russian*

BY G. P. FEDOTOV

WHAT terms, what concepts shall we use to characterize "Russianness?" If it is difficult to reduce the live multiformity of the individual to a system of concepts, how much harder is it to define the still more complex multiformity of the collective personality. It is always given to us as a unity of widely divergent, often conflicting individualities. To find their common denominator is impossible. What have Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy in common? Try to isolate their common essence—and you will find next to nothing. And yet there can be no valid definition of Russianness that would exclude Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and so many others who do not resemble them at all. A foreigner is more likely to grasp the common element that eludes us. But then, most generalizations by foreigners bear the stamp of insufferable banality. Our own evaluations of the French, the German, the English national character are certainly in no way better.

The difficulty is apparently insurmountable. The only way out would be to renounce a fallacious monism and to portray the collective soul as a unity of opposites. The multiformity that would otherwise submerge us may then be reduced to the polarity of two further irreducible types. Not the circle, but the ellipse is the appropriate diagram of the collective personality. The two centers of the ellipse create the tension which alone makes possible the life and the movement of the constantly changing collective organism. All its manifestations may be traced to the one or the other of the two centers. To some extent this scheme does violence to reality—less drastically, however, than do monistic conceptions. On closer examination, each of the two centers will appear to us as a multiplex unity that can be resolved into its component elements. This may be no more than a working method, but it is one that justifies itself by results. If it fails to satisfy our—plainly unrealizable—longing for a spiritual-national monism (which can manifest itself only in the ultimate harmony of the Kingdom of God), it yet explains reason-

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ably well the nature of the historical process, the drama of the perpetual dissensions and crises, and the very possibility of development.

If today, in exile, we ask this or that émigré of the rank and file to describe the Russian character, we are sure to be offered two contrasting pictures. As often as not these different images correspond to the political camp of the émigré. To those of the Right and to those of the Left, Russia and the Russian show a different face.

Let us have a look at the left-wing image. This Russian is a life-long seeker after truth, an enthusiast serving ideals with self-sacrificial ardor but frequently changing his gods and idols. He is utterly devoted to the people, to art, to ideas; eager to become a martyr for some noble cause; an irreconcilable foe of dishonesty, of compromise. An extremist in his dedication to ideas, he lives in the clouds and is estranged from reality—rootless, yet a saint in the full meaning of the word, a saint above material interests. Of the four elements, he is closest to fire and most alien to the earth—and yet he wishes to serve the earth, envisaging this service in terms of flame, conflagration, molten metal. In terms of religion, his is the eschatological type of Christianity—without a terrestrial home, but thirsting for the City of God. Or rather in search of a “New Heaven” and a “New Earth.” He loathes nothing so much as moderation, regularity, the virtues of restraint and reasonableness, the smugness of a self-complacent culture. Culture, as the realm of consummate form, leaves him cold; he dreams of remolding all forms in his own crucible. The process of creation is more important to him than its product, the search for truth more important than truth itself, heroic death more important than a life full of labor. Usually he regards Belinsky as his ancestor and (today!) Dostoevsky as his supreme spokesman. It is not difficult to recognize in this image the self-portrait of the Russian intelligentsia,—not of the Russian educated class as a whole, but of that “order” whose origin goes back to the eighteen thirties.

However, the intelligentsia, this latest layer of Russian culture, is not entirely lacking in national roots—or, more exactly, counterparts. For here we have to do not with the direct influence of deep popular forces but with the obscure subconscious play of the folk-soul, which in the destiny of these pseudo-renegades of nation and country repeats the features of another type, deeply embedded in the national psyche. Apostates, runaways, seekers, pilgrims—are

found not only on the upper level but also in the lowest stratum of the people. We meet them among the adherents of the numerous religious sects as well as among the wider circle of spiritually disturbed Russian men and women, restless seekers after religious truth. They embody the kenotic, Christ-centered brand of Russian religiosity, eternally opposed to the prevailing ritualism in liturgy and customs. These kenotic forces of folk religiosity were released by the schism of the seventeenth century, when the Church lost its former unity. The quest for a new spiritual haven began with the first doubts about the absolute orthodoxy of the Muscovite-Petersburg tsardom. Thus this national type, so vividly brought to life by the Russian literature of the nineteenth century, while comparatively of late formation, is yet much older than the intelligentsia and approximately coincides with the Empire. This does not mean that it did not spring from more ancient sources: it had a forerunner in the kenotic type of ancient Russian holiness. But its estrangement from reality, its restlessness, stamp it as a spiritual phenomenon belonging to modern history.

It is interesting to note that the Russian intelligentsia, beside its popular counterparts, has still another parallel, ever more noticeable towards the close of the nineteenth century. It is the Jewish parallel. It is not an accident that ever since the eighties, with the beginning of the exodus from the ghetto, an intimate fusion of the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia became apparent—not only in the common revolutionary struggle but in all spiritual aspirations and the essential attitude towards life: the ardent rootlessness, the eschatological prophetism. It was a spiritual atmosphere which in its intensity recalls early Christianity—deprived, however, of the central pivot of faith and therefore apt to breed aberrations of the most fanatically sectarian kind. Russian reactionaries are right in linking the intelligentsia with Judaism. But they distort the historical perspective in representing the Jews as the seducers of innocent Russian youth. The “order” of the Russian intelligentsia had long been in existence and had taken up the fight against autocracy at a time when the influx from the ghetto—attracted by spiritual affinity—had hardly begun. It is this affinity that makes the short-sighted Western observer describe the “âme slave” in Jewish terms. While many are inclined to view the Zionist endeavor in Palestine as the work of Russian intellectuals, Spengler regards the coteries of the Russian intelligentsia—which he abhors—as reflecting the spirit and tradition of the Talmudists. There certainly

was prevalent a specific Russian-Jewish atmosphere, of which a Jewish poet has said: "Blessed he who ever breathed that air."

And yet, only a foreigner may be forgiven for not distinguishing between Slavic and Semitic features in the amalgam of the intellectual-sectarian type. Surely there was nothing Jewish in Belinsky; and when Tolstoy spoke of Dostoevsky's Jewishness, he meant it, of course, in the widest metaphorical sense. The difference is subtle but plainly perceptible—rather one of style, of aesthetic pattern, than of ethical contents—which, after all, is true of most national distinctions. The kinship between the intelligentsia and popular sectarianism, on the other hand, is a primary phenomenon, sufficient in itself to establish this type of intellectual as one of the historical formations of the Russian soul.

I believe that many, and not only among the right-wingers, will refuse to acknowledge the intelligentsia as the deepest manifestation of Russianness. To myself, whenever today, in exile, I try to conjure up a pure image of the Russian, he presents himself under a different aspect. Profound calm, taciturnity, on the surface even apathy. An organic aversion for anything high-flown, high-strung, extravagant. Simplicity often carried so far as to shun a word, a gesture too much. "Silence is golden." Serene, self-confident power. The silence reflects profound Oriental experience absorbed in the blood. Hence a strain of fatalism. Hence also the humor—the tolerant smile at the foreground of life, at the ceaseless fretting and fussing of the intellect. Humor and restraint are features this type of Russian shares with the Anglo-Saxon. In the opinion of some, by the way, only the Russians and the English possess a genuine sense of humor. Tolstoy and his set—the "high society" of Anna Karenina—in all of Europe felt most at home in the Anglo-Saxon world, the only one they respected. However, this superficial similarity covers a vastly divergent experience—Western activism and Oriental fatalism; but in both worlds the violence of elemental forces was tamed by centuries-old discipline.

I shall not attempt here to define the moral aspect of this type of Russian. I believe that, as a rule, one should avoid over-precise moral characterizations of national types. The good and the wicked, the vicious and the pure are found among all of them, probably in the same proportion. What matters are the shades of goodness, of purity etc., the "how" and not the "what,"—which means definitions rather in aesthetic (in the widest sense) terms. Is the Russian kind? Quite often he is. When he is, his kindness combined with

his own peculiar quiet wisdom, produces one of the finest human types. How we long for it in our warped life, swayed as we are by all kinds of passions—and be it spiritual passions! But the Russian can be cruel too—this we know well by now—and not only in a brief flare-up of fury but in a smugly callous, ruthlessly selfish way. Most often he amazes us by a kind of Oriental indifference to the lot and the sufferings of others—coupled with gentleness and superficial compassion (Karataev!). There is something Chinese in the impassive attitude of the Russian peasant towards his own and his fellowmen's death. This kind of wisdom takes us beyond the limits of Christianity. Tolstoy was profoundly aware of the primeval, prehistoric roots of this indifference ("The Three Deaths").

Nor is it easy to generalize about the volitional nature of the Russian. Is he indolent or active? More often than not he appears lazy; he works under pressure, pulling himself together only at the very last; but then he does not spare himself and is capable of making up in a few days for months of idleness. But there are also Russians of dogged industry, performing their tasks with restrained but intense passion; such were to be found among kulaks, inventors, scientists, even administrators. The amorphous mass of the people readily submits to the leadership of this sturdy élite, while seldom respecting it. Without this ruthless and strong-willed type the creation of the Empire, and even of the Muscovite state, would have been unthinkable.

In mentioning the Muscovite state, we are offering a clue to the understanding of this second brand of Russian. Its embodiment is the Muscovite, as his hard historical destinies have shaped him. For two or three centuries rough hands had been at work kneading the Slavic dough, knocking, bruising, breaking in the recalcitrant stuff, molding it into an extremely tenacious form. The Petrine Empire overlaid the Muscovite tsardom with a varnish of European culture, but it was still the Muscovite type that remained the real mainstay. To this type belong all those classes that were little touched by the Petersburg culture. All the clergy, the merchant class, the thrifty part of the peasantry (insofar as it was not undermined by spiritual restlessness). We meet this type again in the great Russian literature, where it is, however, pushed into the background by later spiritual formations. It is reflected most vividly in the regional literature—the writings of Aksakov, Leskov, Melnikov, Mamin-Sibiriak. And Tolstoy, of course. Although he cannot be fitted altogether into the Muscovite mold, he stemmed from it, had a

deep fondness for this type, and was apt to idealize it. Karataev, Kutuzov, Levin are Muscovites; and so are Captain Mironov and Maxim Maximovich—Muscovite state servants who have survived the Petrine upheaval. The plodding official under Nicholas I, so ill-treated by the satirical literature of the time, represents the last layer of the Muscovite formation. We meet this type also on the highest cultural level: Pososhkov, Bolotov, the Aksakovs, Zabelin, Kliuchevsky—all these are authentic Muscovites. Here is the source of Russian creative power—which, however, like all things ultra-national, is rather limited in outlook. The narrow-mindedness of Tolstoy and Mussorgsky can assume truly tragical forms.

Such are the two polar types of Russianness, to whose conflict the high drama of the nineteenth century is largely due. They may be regarded as the expression of the basic dualism inherent in the Russian soul. They are, however, only the latest historically conditioned manifestations of this duality. Of all the successive cultural layers of the Russian soul, they represent the Muscovite stratum and that latest formation, the intelligentsia, born in the eighteenth-thirties. But the historical approach to the problem of the Russian character makes it imperative to look beyond the limits of this duality. Between Muscovy and the intelligentsia there lies the Empire. Nor did Russia begin with Muscovy. What remains today of the Russian of the Empire, the Russian of the Kievan era, of Novgorod?

When, basing our claim on Pushkin, we assert with Dostoevsky that the Russian is a universalist, and that in this lies his national mission, it is actually the imperial Russian we have in mind. Universality is characteristic neither of the Muscovite nor of a true representative of the intelligentsia. On the contrary, the distinctive feature of both is narrow-mindedness, sectarianism. The Petrine reform, however, had brought Russia out into the open spaces of the world, had placed her at the crossroads of all the great Western civilizations and had brought into being the species of the Russian-European. His main attribute is freedom and openness of mind—such as to set him apart not only from the Muscovite but also from the European of the West. European culture, taken as a whole, was more intensely alive on the banks of the Neva or Moskva than on those of the Seine, the Thames, or the Spree. It is this imperial upper-class stratum that has given rise to the myth of the Russian's peculiar gift for foreign languages. Actually the average Russian,

whether Muscovite or of the intelligentsia, is totally devoid of linguistic ability and finds it hard to adjust himself to strange countries and alien surroundings. But the Russian-European felt at home everywhere.

Throughout the two centuries of his existence, we have known him in two incarnations: the wanderer and the builder. Weak natures were easily crushed by the wealth of the alien culture. The conflict between the traditional Russian values and those of the new Westernized life was apt to generate skepticism, shallowness and premature weariness. Beginning with the "petits-maitres" of the eighteenth century, "whose hearts belonged to the French Crown," a long chain of so-called "superfluous people," including the Onegin, Rudin, Raskin, stretches across Russian literature. Not so long ago it was customary to regard this as the basic trend of Russian life. This is a stupendous misunderstanding, a historical-literary aberration. We are well acquainted with another type of Russian-European—one that had retained the strong will of the Muscovite, his bond with the motherland, and sometimes even his religious faith. It was men like these who built the Empire, who fought its wars and made its laws, who sowed the seeds of enlightenment. Such were "the fledglings of Peter's nest," although in fairness it must be admitted that this type had come into being before Peter's time. Its genealogy begins with the Boyar Matveev, with Ordyn-Nashchokin, maybe even with Kurbsky. They reached their culminating point in the era of Alexander I. Under him they occupied the highest government posts. There was no rift yet between government and culture. Pushkin, "the bard of Empire and of freedom," was the last great embodiment of that imperial type. It did not, however, completely disappear even after the break between monarchy and culture under Nicholas I. In the "Era of the Great Reforms" the "Russian-Europeans" for a time came again into their own. We saw "the last Mohicans" of the type ourselves in the Senate and the Imperial Council under the last two tsars; deprived of power and influence, they still retained their rich experience, their political wisdom, alas! no longer needed by the degenerate dynasty. But on a lower level, within the administration, the courts, the liberal professions, the local self-government, and, of course, the universities, it was largely the "Europeans" who carried on their shoulders the whole burden of cultural activities under excruciatingly difficult conditions. Nearly always they shunned politics in order to concentrate on the only tasks open to them.

Hence their lack of popularity in a country that for generations had been breathing the exhalations of civil war. Nevertheless, in every city, every district, these zealots of culture left some achievement behind them—here a school, there a learned society, a model farm, or just the memory of a dedicated physician, a humane judge, a noble man. It was they who preserved Russia from stagnating and freezing up at a time when every effort was made from above to put her on ice, and from below to set her aflame. While the Muscovite formed the backbone of Russia, the Russian-European was her builder. However, as we have pointed out, this creative, constructive type derived itself from Muscovite roots. While his lifework often compelled the "European" to wage a tenacious fight against the Muscovite's inertia and indolence, he yet shared with the latter a common moral ideal, a common love of Russia and her "soul." Kliuchevsky's history and Russian music were his link with Moscow. Whenever this link crumbled away, he would become a rolling-stone, no longer capable of constructive work. Under certain circumstances he might turn into an "intellectual"; this is the upper-class source of the intelligentsia, quite distinct from its democratic springs. But so long as he stood at his post, performing some vital task, he remained loyal to Russia and to the Muscovite principle of service. In the beginning of the twentieth century, notably after the revolution of 1905, the creative Russian-European element showed signs of impetuous growth at the expense of the intelligentsia. It looked as if the future belonged to it. . . . Fate decided differently.

What features of the Russian may be traced to the early Russia of warring principalities and free city-republics? Fully aware that we are embarking upon arbitrary and even fantastic speculations, we yet venture an answer: that aspect of the Russian character usually called its "largeness"; its unruliness; its rebelliousness—neither ideological nor sectarian—but rooted in a deep organic aversion to any kind of rigid form. Even today, the Russian heart still responds to the ancient chronicles, to the "Lay of Prince Igor." To state it boldly: it is not the stern builders of Empire, and not the statesmen, who most strongly appeal to Russian national emotions, but the knightly princes, the dare-devil Mstislavs, the Viking Sviatoslav, the tumultuous freedom of Novgorod. Muscovy certainly never succeeded in wholly disciplining the Slavic unruliness. It erupted in the free Cossack communities, in the sporadic uprisings; in the nineteenth century it found an outlet in debauchery and high living, in fantastic dissipation, in the bohemianism and

artistic trend of the Russian character. This side of the Russian soul finds a most adequate expression in the gipsy song and dance. Russian debauchery is often somber and heavy, an effect, maybe, of Tartar blood and Muscovite oppression; but it can also be gay, generous, magnanimous. Such were the revelries of Pushkin, who combined Europeanism with Russian reckless freedom. Many talented Russians have succumbed to their nature (A. Grigoriev); and yet this characteristic, so long as it is to some extent held in check by self-discipline and education, is inseparable from Russian genius. "How fond I am of drunks!" Tolstoy once inadvertently confessed.

Gloom and childlike gaiety are the two poles of Russian unruliness. In the mood of youthful light-heartedness, generosity, sparkling high spirits, the Russian character is at its most attractive. This gaiety, however, is ephemeral. Unaccountable joy does not satisfy the Russian for long. He is likely to come to a grim and tragic end. If he fails to settle down in time (Muscovite fashion), his end is a ruined life, or a monk's hood.

Is it possible to penetrate still deeper into the Russian soul—beyond Kiev and Novgorod, beyond the threshold of history? If we remove, like skin after skin from a bulb, the successive cultural layers deposited by history, shall we find in the Russian a central irreducible core? It may be that our question is not posed correctly. The national soul is not given in history. The ethnic psyche serves only as the raw material of history. That psyche, moreover, is not all of a piece: Slavs, Finns, Turks,—all have gone into the making of the Russian soul. A nation is not a tree or an animal whose potentialities are all enclosed in the seed. The nation is rather to be compared to a musical or poetical work whose first measures or lines do not necessarily convey the main theme. Sometimes this theme is not revealed until the very end. It may be that in this sense (as revelation of an idea) the nineteenth century was more truly national than Kiev or Muscovy. Without assuming in any way that Slavic paganism contained in embryo the idea of Russianness (how could we differentiate here between Eastern and Southern Slavs—between Russians and Bulgars or Serbs?)—we yet believe it worthwhile to peer into this mysterious depth. Better than other civilized peoples we have preserved the organic, pre-Christian foundations of the national soul. Deep at the root of the greatest masterpieces of Russian literature there is something akin to the primitivism of folklore. Tiutchev, Tolstoy, Rozanov have distilled, as it

were, in the apparatus of high spiritual pressure, the primordial stuff of Russian paganism.

Where shall we look for a key to it? We cannot go here beyond a few suggestions, the first steps leading down into the subterranean galleries of the Russian soul. Some time ago W. W. Weidlé (*Sovremennye Zapiski*, No. 64) attempted, rightly so in my opinion, to link this Russian essence with the family principle. As late as the nineteenth century, the Russian-Slav was not yet wholly estranged from Mother-Earth. His intimate union with the world of nature makes individual existence difficult and strange. Nature for him is not landscape, not a background for his daily life, and still less, of course, an object of conquest. He is embedded in her as in the maternal womb; he responds to her with all his being; apart from her he dries up and cannot live. He has not realized yet the frightfulness of her ruthless beauty, the frightfulness of death—since there is nothing in him that can die. All that is valuable and lofty in the human being is generic, communal, indestructible. And that which is individual is not worth immortality. The moral law of the individual, his right to his own conscience, to self-determination—these things have no validity in face of the law of life. In the moral sphere this attitude leads to communal, collective ethics based on the principle of mutual responsibility. In art it generates an enormous power of sensuous perception and suggestion (derived from *Gea*, the Earth), which is offset by weakness of form and of individual creative design. In the pursuit of knowledge it leads, of course, to irrationalism and reliance on intuition. In work and social life it leads to distrust of all planning, system, organization. The Slavophile ideal, for all its consciously Christian character, is strongly imbued with this pagan element of the Slavic psyche. In the life of the common people, however, we find it already sublimated by the Church and, this has led to the widely held assumption that it forms the very essence of Eastern Christianity. Actually it has nothing to do with Christianity; rather it takes us far eastwards. Another step, and we are in India with her total obliteration of the individual.

The question arises: where in this historically stratified scheme of the Russian soul is its Christian, its Orthodox layer? The truth is that there is more than one such layer, since there are actually as many brands of Russian Christianity as there are historical types of the Russian, and maybe more. Just as every nation experiences Christianity in its own way, so every cultural stratum of a nation

has its own key to Christianity, or at least its own nuances of it. There is no need, however, to distinguish between fine shades of Christianity in the Russian soul; all the contradictions stand out with stark boldness. Just try to express in one formula the religiosity of St. Sergius and the Archpriest Avvakum, that of the Metropolitan Philaret and of Dostoevsky. For good measure, add to these Greek-Orthodox folklore and the religion of Tolstoy!

The opinion is widely held that the Russian people are set apart from other European peoples by the peculiar intensity of their religiosity. Actually this impression derives from the fact that the twentieth century finds Russia and the rest of Europe in different acts of the religious-historical drama. In Russia, among the great mass of the people, the Middle Ages lived on right down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries would offer a closer analogy to imperial Russia. But the collapse of Russian medievalism was stormy and destructive in the extreme. Today the attitude towards religion, both on the part of the masses and of the intelligentsia, is not markedly different from that in other European countries.

. . . And now let us turn to our basic problem: which historical layers of the Russian soul have been destroyed by the Revolution and which will survive it? The answer now should be clear. The extermination of the old educated class and the suppression of all the sources that fed it were bound to remove the two uppermost strata from the spiritual structure of Russian society. The man of Empire and the intellectual perished together with the "bourgeoisie," the upper layer of the old society. As to the imperial type, the Russian of universal culture, some relics of it still survive within the ranks of the "specialists." Some time ago, the [Soviet] government belatedly realized that the liquidation of the upper cultural stratum was doing irreparable harm to technical progress. The surviving old-timers became the object of special attention. However, they were valued only in their capacity of specialists in some narrow field; as has been wittily said, golden watches were used to drive in nails. Their broad culture, no longer needed by anyone and even offensive to the new ruling class, still subsists within some tiny groups or even families. The new educated class produces exclusively specialists who often lack the rudiments of a general culture, even plain literacy. On the other hand, never since the Muscovite tsardom has Russia been fenced off from Europe by such a high wall. This wall has been erected not only by censorship and

the ban on foreign travel, but also by inordinate conceit and outright contempt for decaying bourgeois Europe. Here lies the essential difference between the semi-literate technical intelligentsia of Tsar Peter and a similar intelligentsia under Stalin. That of Stalin has deliberately turned its back on Europe and in so doing has cut short the line of the "universal" Russian.

More complex was the fate of the intelligentsia proper. By the time the revolution broke out, this extraordinary formation had already lost its former vitality. After 1905 the intelligentsia began to dissolve, losing its identity within the whole of the "cultured" class. It was unable to survive the collapse of its political mysticism, desecrated by the pathetic Russian constitutionalism; the new brilliant religious-philosophical culture of the Russian renaissance of the twentieth century demoralized it with its many seductions; the war drew it into the stream of a national consciousness new to it. By 1917 the revolutionary enthusiasm of the intelligentsia was already a warmed-up dish. Its roots did not go deep, and the size of this social group, the only one to give loyal support to the Provisional Government, had shrunk considerably. The October Revolution hit it with all its weight. Dedicated to principles and uncompromising, the intelligentsia was utterly unable to acquiesce in the triumph of brute force. No wonder that the struggle against the new rulers bled it white. The few who survived either went into exile or filled Soviet prisons and concentration camps. Some managed to adjust themselves to the conditions of Soviet bureaucracy and turned into "specialists," gradually losing the last features of their noble "order." The mills of a brutal way of life were grinding without mercy. In the words of a Russian proverb—"to live with wolves one has to howl with them." Those unable to adjust themselves were cast out of the new life. The new intelligentsia now emerging is organically devoted to the Soviet régime; it feels a blood kinship with both the people and the ruling class. And for this reason it can never—not even in opposition, not even (let us anticipate the future) engaged in a revolutionary struggle against those in power—degenerate into that rootlessly-ideological, extremist, and eschatological type, let alone the dedicated fraternity we call the Russian intelligentsia.

However, this defunct Russian type is not entirely without successors. Sectarianism and spiritual journeying have not died out in the people, as insistently testified by the "godless" press. The Revolution has even given rise to some new sectarian formations,

usually of an eschatological nature. On the other hand, part of the old intelligentsia have found a spiritual foothold in the Church. Here the last remnants of the vanished "order" can quench their spiritual thirst from the same spring that, unknown to them, had generated it. Within the Church they have, of course, preserved their psychological characteristics: their restlessness and extremism, their thirst for an integrated, consecrated life. Here they find themselves on common ground with the searchers and pilgrims of the people. One should keep in mind that the spiritual barrier between Church and dissenters is no longer what it was before the Revolution. Persecution has brought the various creeds closer together. The remnants of the old intelligentsia act as a ferment upon the whole religious mass. So far, however, this force has either been completely eliminated from all constructive cultural work or else has voluntarily turned away from it. Insofar as Russian culture of the immediate future is concerned, the old type of intellectual is definitely extinct.

What remains is the Muscovite with his vague ancestral heritage. The masses of the people who, molded by Soviet schools, produce the new human being, until quite recently lived and thought after the Muscovite pattern. The most radical ideological upheaval is powerless wholly to remake a spiritual mold. In the internationalist, the Marxist of today, whoever he may be, it is easy to recognize the village lad, the factory worker, as we remember them from the turn of the century. Paradoxical as it may sound, *homo Europaeo-Americanus* seems closer to Muscovy than to the more recent Petersburg era. The paradox is easily explained. *Homo Europaeo-Americanus* has little claim on the rich heritage of Europe's culture. He emerged in Europe in the period of her barbarization and assimilated a civilization already narrowed down to its athletic, technical, military contents. The savage of our time, technician or athlete, is the product of the disintegration of ancient culture going hand in hand with the absorption of barbarians into the civilized world. The Muscovite who, biding his time in rural Russia, outlasted two centuries of imperial culture, does not need any great effort to keep step with a Europe that has come to curse the last two centuries of her history. What might seem really amazing is the ease with which religion has been repudiated. But this is a special, highly complex theme. As to everything else, the Muscovite lout only had to be shaken up and kicked around for a while, to be jolted out of his indolence and sluggishness. What the tsarist barracks once did to

the recruit, the Party and the Komsomol are doing today—training country bumpkins and turning them into disciplined soldiers. The Muscovite provides admirable material for discipline, military discipline in particular. He formed the backbone of the old imperial army, the best in the world, maybe, in quality of manpower. The age-old habit of obedience, the weakness of individual consciousness and of the desire for freedom, the greater ease of living within a collective body and of working in a team—all this forms a bond between the Soviet citizen and Muscovy of yore. Muscovy had by no means been poor in social forces, rather the reverse; they had been so strong as to smother the individual; it was not without reason that the Muscovite national economy had a semi-socialist character. Stalin today consciously strives to establish himself as the successor of the tsars and the hetmans. Tsar and Pugachov in one. . . . The transfer of the capital back to Moscow is a symbolic act. The Revolution has failed to destroy the Russian national type but has appallingly crippled and impoverished it.

The Russian unruliness is, of course, indestructible. It was strong in the Muscovite tsardom; it is still there under Stalin. It ran riot in the violence of the first years of the Revolution; it finds a blatant outlet today in the debauchery which constantly undermines the foundations of Communist discipline; it is alive in the reckless daring of Russian fliers and arctic explorers. All that is colorful today in Russian life and Russian art is reminiscent of the heroic periods of Russian history. Russian unruliness, while not the same as freedom, still saves the face of contemporary Russia from the universal, uniform stigma of slavery. Strong natures still seek and find outlets for their energy. And the presence of these forces strengthens our hope of liberation—however remote it may still appear.

And what about the deepest—Slavic-pagan—layers of the Russian soul? To what extent have they been preserved? This we do not know. The powerful process of rationalization ruthlessly destroys all that is subconscious and elemental, fills up all the deep wells, renders the Russian character shallow and transparent. But is the process completed? Are there no remote corners left where ancient beliefs are still alive, where the primordial bond with Mother-Earth has not been broken? After all, village sorcery and shamanism are by no means dead, as we are informed from time to time by Soviet ethnographers. Why should there not be traces somewhere of the dimmer and subtler complexes of the tribal pantheistic psyche? We know that something of this must be there; surely Prishvin does not

write in a vacuum—he must have sympathetic readers. What we do not know is whether these survivals are sufficient to feed once again a great literature. For in this alone lies the significance of this dark Russian area. Should it vanish, Russian literature may lose, maybe forever, its subterranean springs. Lacking a sense of form, it can never achieve anything like the culture of formal perfection created by the Latin and the French genius. Its course is different. Even the spiritual depth of a Dostoevsky affords a glimpse of another—earthy—depth, that of the Shatovs and the Karamazovs. . . .

Regretfully we admit that we have found no definite answer to our problem. With the question still open, we now conclude our preliminary study of the post-revolutionary Russian as the potential creator of a Russian culture of the future.

The Soviet Railway System: Policy and Operation

BY MICHAEL S. MIRSKI

I

IT is probably in the field of railroading that some of the weaker spots of Soviet planning can be most easily detected. It is here, too, that the greatest contrast can be observed between two opposing systems: that of socialism, as it exists in Russia, and that of modern capitalism, based on private, corporate or mixed (private and state) enterprise.

In the history of capitalist railroad construction, now largely a thing of the past in the leading industrial countries of the West and the United States, we note that building activities were broadly determined by the requirements of existing markets, which, in turn, were developed and expanded because of newly established communications. By contrast, socialism's aims were motivated from the beginning, and continue to be so, by state planning, masterminded by individuals who retained top positions of power. This appears to be the primary reason why Soviet railway policy, in the light of actual economic experience, appears far less dynamic and flexible than that of capitalist countries.

In the history of modern capitalism, railroad construction played a very important part. It greatly affected the circulation of capital, both national and international, the stock market, the real estate market, the market for labor, and both individual and corporate income. It also affected, indirectly but not less actively, the production of industrial goods, especially capital goods, and that of basic raw materials: coal, steel, and others.

In this capitalist march towards progress, pre-Communist Russia was no exception. Having already built 14,300 miles of railway track in 20 years between 1861 and 1882, Imperial Russia built another 32,000 miles in the 30 years between 1882 and the First World War.

The Russian achievement in the 90's was due to the energy and talents of Serge Witte, an eminent specialist in railroading, and Russia's Minister of Finance from 1892 to 1903. In 1881, the

Imperial government had decided upon state ownership, and through Witte's tireless efforts in the 90's, a large part of the existing private railways was acquired by the government. In 1913, 70% of the railway network constituted government property, while only 30% remained in private hands.¹

The trans-Siberian railway (1891-1905), which spanned the whole European and Asiatic continent from Moscow to Vladivostok was Witte's brain child. It brought Russian railways to the Pacific Ocean, and opened to the Empire a tremendous territory, abundant in natural resources and potential wealth. Siberia began soon to export its products. The Turkestan-Siberian railway was started next. This railway was intended to open up a rich cotton area for the Empire, and also to connect Russian Turkestan² with Central Siberia and the sources of the Ob and Enissey rivers.

On the eve of the Revolution, this new railroad was put into operation between Orenburg (now Chkalov), situated west of the Urals, and Tashkent in Central Asia. The track was laid through the fertile irrigated cotton-producing valley of the Syr-Daria river and the equally irrigated belt of oases lying in Southern Turkestan at the foot of the mountains separating Russia from Afghanistan and Sinkiang in Northern China. Oil fields were already in exploitation here in the Fergana Valley. More of it had been discovered, however, northeast of Tashkent at Verny (today Alma-Ata), and the whole region of Southern Turkestan was found to be very rich in mineral wealth of various kinds. Further northeast, at the sources of the rapidly flowing Tom, tributary of the great northern river Ob, where the huge Siberian plain reaches the slopes of high mountain ridges lying between the territories of Russia and Mongolia, some of the richest coal deposits in the world were found and gradually put into operation (The Kuznetsk Basin).

It was intended to tap these enormous resources of newly-discovered wealth by means of a second segment of the Turkestan-Siberian railway. It would continue east along the rich border region from Tashkent to the Verny oil basin, and further to the Kuznetsk coal fields. This new branch would become linked with the trans-Siberian at the river Tom. This strategic junction would open the way from Central Asia to all points east and west along the trans-Siberian,

¹N. Riabov, *Sotsialisticheskoe nakoplenie i ego istochniki v pervoi i vtoroi piatiletke*, 1951, p. 9.

²Most of Russian Turkestan finds itself to-day in the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan.

points north as far as the Arctic Ocean via Western Siberia along the Tom-Ob waterways, and points south to the rich Altai region by way of the Tom. Along these various routes cotton, coal, Siberian lumber, manufactured products, and other goods, would circulate in all directions, bringing new life to vast new regions. The final branch of the Turkestan railway was completed under the Soviets in 1931, and renamed the "Turksib," the Soviet abbreviation for Turkestan-Siberian railway. It received wide publicity as a Soviet achievement.

Another railroad was to cross Russian Turkestan from north to south. It would originate from the trans-Siberian railway in Western Siberia at Petropavlovsk, and span the province southward to the Chinese border. Of this railway, the section Petropavlousa-Akmolinsk (in North-Central Asia) was built and put into operation. It reached deep into Turkestan territory, and provided a central artery of communications for the agricultural, northern part of the province. Akmolinsk, on the outskirts of the drier and more arid steppes of the interior (which compose the greatest part of Russian Turkestan) was intended to play an important rôle in the future. It assumed the strategic position of a railway center located on the borderline between a large agricultural section (Western Siberia) and a vast cattle-raising country (the steppes of Central Turkestan).

Finally, previously built, there was a third Asiatic railway (the trans-Caspian) which spanned the southernmost region of Russian Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to Tashkent (through Samarkand, the ancient capital of Tamerlan). This railway was valuable for many purposes, the newly-discovered oil of the Fergana valley in South-Central Asia could now be carried inland to European Russia via the water route of the Caspian Sea and the Volga, as well as to the refineries of the Caucasus. The railway also had an important military significance and was intended to bring closer to the Empire formerly distant provinces inhabited by various nationalities of non-Russian stock. It brought Russia closer to China and the resources of the East.

In the West, Imperial Russia built many railways intended both to serve the strategic purpose of defending the country and to develop the growing new industrial centers of Western Russia and Poland. The central industrial region around Moscow was provided with railroads. The extreme North, however, and parts of the South of European Russia remained with few railways.

The railway policy of the Empire, closely linked to its general

aims in Europe and Asia, was apparent as early as the 1860's. It became part of a clearly conceived and tightly knit system, however, only with Witte. Witte was logical in his actions and thought of the expanding railway system in terms of general policy and organization, and, while improving and enlarging the railways, he at all times kept an eye towards the future.

The railway policy of the Empire, during Witte's administration pursued the following goals:³ (1) A general extension of interior Russian markets; (2) the fostering of new markets for growing industry (first, for the interior Moscow industrial region, and later for the newer industrial centers in the West, South, and East); (3) the establishing of closer ties between Russia's border regions and the central, industrial and populated region; (4) the expansion of the export market by building railways in such a way as to facilitate exports abroad; and (5) the defense of the Empire (roads in the West and South-West, in Central and Eastern Asia).

Witte's aims were most ambitious; he visualized, in the building of the trans-Siberian, and of the other lines that were to follow in Asia, a tremendous expansion of Russian commerce and influence.

A major part of railroad construction in Russia was financed through loans, domestic and foreign. The initial rôle of private capital, however, in creating the railway system should by no means be underestimated. As early as the decade of 1856-1865, 12 railway corporations had been organized in various parts of Russia, with a capitalization of 200 million rubles. In the following 5 years (1866-1870), 35 new companies were brought to life, sharing a capital of 586.3 million rubles, and carrying the total railway investment to the huge total of over three-quarters of a billion rubles—fifty years before the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. It is worth noting that during the aforementioned five-year period, between 1866 and 1870, 80% of the total investment in Russia went into railroad construction (total investment 1866-1870: 669.2 million rubles).⁴

Summing up, in Imperial Russia contemporary capitalism accomplished a tremendous and, on the whole, very successful job in the field of railroading. On the eve of the October Revolution, however, after experiencing a second major upsurge of railroad construction in the 90's, Russia was still one of the few major countries left where

³P. A. Khromov, *Ekonomicheskoe razvitiie Rossii v. IX-XX vekakh*, 1950, p. 210. See also, "Government Report on the Significance of the Siberian Railway," 1893, *Industries of Russia*, Vol. III-IV, St. Petersburg, 1893.

⁴P. A. Khromov, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

railroad construction remained profitable. This could be said of parts of European Russia, but an even vaster expanse of land lay open for major investment in Asia, east of the Ural mountains.

We will now turn to subsequent developments, which followed during the era of Soviet government.

II

The Revolution and the Civil War that followed wrought extensive destruction on the imperial railroad system. Miles of track were torn up; equipment was damaged and failed to be restored. The rolling stock suffered tremendously. Practically no new railroads were built. At the same time, the need for railroads increased tremendously. Violent movements of population and troops swept the country in all directions during the early years of the Revolution and Civil War, while the circulation of goods declined sharply.

Even greater damage was suffered by the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The German invasion subjected railway communications in the U.S.S.R. to an enormous destruction. According to Soviet statistics, the Germans totally disabled 26 major railway lines, and partially destroyed eight. All in all, during the war years, destruction of railway property amounted to 40,389 miles of track and 13,000 bridges. Also destroyed were 15,800 locomotives, damaged, or taken out of the country, together with 428,000 railroad cars.⁵ Admitting these figures may be inflated, Russian war losses remain stupendous.⁶

Summarizing all losses, it is not surprising that Soviet construction in the period of 30 years following the Revolution, i.e., between 1918 and 1948, added to the railroad network only 18,600 miles, or 58% only of what had been built under the Empire in the 30 years preceding the First World War (1882-1913).⁷

Material losses caused by revolution and war cannot, however,

⁵T. Khachaturov, "Transport v periode perekhoda ot sotsializma k komunizmu," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 8, August, 1951, p. 37.

⁶It should be noted that, statistically, losses must be balanced against equipment seized in conquered or invaded countries, before net losses are established. Also, Lend-Lease from the United States and England was an important net asset, strengthening Soviet communications during the war. Cf. pamphlet, "How Shall Lend-Lease Accounts be Settled?," prepared for the American Historical Association by the present writer and published by the War Department, Washington, 1945.

⁷B. I. Levin, *Puti rekonstruktsii zheleznodorozhnogo transporta v poslevoennoy stalinskoy piatiletke*, Moscow, 1949, p. 7.

be deemed solely responsible for the very slight growth of mileage, which, being inadequate for accelerated industrialization and growing population, virtually constituted a set-back. This low key figure cannot be judged adequately without an analysis of certain aspects both of Soviet railway policy and of the nature of railroad operations in the Soviet Union in general.

To understand the principles of Soviet planning, especially with regard to railroading, it is necessary to go as far back as the XVIth Congress of the Communist Party which met in 1930. The decisions of this Congress had to be taken in an atmosphere of great emergency. Having abolished the NEP, the government in 1930 was in the process of actively enforcing and putting into practice the provisions of the First Five-Year Plan. As it did so, the country dropped to the very bottom of an intense economic crisis. This was accompanied by implacable political struggle and social warfare that knew no mercy.

Historians have described this period as Russia's "second revolution," which, following upon the "hothouse prosperity" of the NEP, plunged the country into renewed violence and desperate internal struggle. The USSR was at the time without technical specialists. Most foreign specialists had hastily left Russia after the abolition of the NEP and the renewal of terrorism that followed the banishment of Trotsky early in 1929. Russian technicians and engineers "compromised" by the NEP were virtually paralysed in their activities. Faced by new and intense economic difficulties, the government saw sabotage everywhere.

At the XVIth Party Congress, Stalin laid the blame for the plight of the country on "capitalist encirclement," and characterized the situation in the following words:

Capitalist encirclement cannot be approached as a simple geographical term. By capitalist encirclement is meant that around the USSR, enemy class forces lie ready to support our class enemies inside the USSR, both morally and materially, and by means of a financial blockade, and, when the occasion arises, by means of military intervention. It has been proven that the sabotage carried out by our specialists, the anti-Soviet activities of our kulaks, arson and explosions in our factories and buildings, are subsidized and inspired from abroad.*

This dark picture was not all propaganda. There was an opposition within the Party, represented by the "right" and "left" de-

*See S. Trapeznikov, *Semnadsataya konferentsiya VKP (b)*, 1950, pp. 8-9. Also, K. A. Petrosian, *Sovetski metod industrializatsii*, 1951, pp. 38 ff., and 114 ff.

viationists. The peasants too were in opposition. Reeling under the blow of recent collectivization, yet not quite vanquished, they did "sabotage" the government in a large part of the country by going into a tacit "strike" and planting only as many crops as were necessary for subsistence. Somewhat naively, they believed the government would have nothing to collect in taxes. Instead, famine broke out.

Largely as a result of forced collectivization, the Ukraine was badly hit. Starvation and its accompanying diseases ravaged the richest agricultural regions of the USSR. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people died in unimaginable misery.⁹

It will be recalled that towards the end of the NEP, Russia had regained economically, after a decade of great difficulties, something like its pre-First World War standard of living, with most indexes having returned to the level of 1913.¹⁰ Most favored, at that time, was the peasantry who had actually benefited from the revolution, acquiring land, independence, and a measure of freedom. Now it was the peasantry that was hit hardest. The Soviet specialists were hardly to blame, but they were effective scapegoats, whom the government (to its own detriment) ferociously persecuted for every new set-back it encountered. Thus, the government was challenged by the economic difficulties, resulting from the liquidation of the NEP, famine resulting from collectivization, and widespread political opposition within the Party. The Soviet régime met this challenge by adopting a series of drastic measures.

Major policy decisions arrived at by the XVIth Congress, which were to affect deeply the railway policy of the USSR for years to come, may be summarized as follows:

It was decided: (1) to create new centers of industry in the East, in Asia, thus removing Soviet production from the potential danger of aggression from the West; (2) to industrialize the country so strongly that it would reach the industrial level of the West in about a decade; (3) to lay the emphasis squarely on heavy industry, at the cost, necessarily, of other branches of the economy, railroad development included.

The government's fear of war which led to industrialization in Asia, in the long run proved justified. The Soviet State has taken pride in the foresight it demonstrated in preparation for future

⁹G. Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, Philadelphia, p. 337.

¹⁰*History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, p. 352.

conflict. Other basic decisions, implementing this fundamental move, however, can hardly be termed a success in the light of subsequent experience.

The foundation of the plan for heavy industry was the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine (UKK). It was recommended in 1930 to the XVIth Party Congress by Stalin himself. At the time it was established, the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine could hardly be justified except for strategic-military reasons. Economically, it was from its inception a very doubtful scheme, and it was opposed by most of the Soviet specialists. But in this period of mounting terror, their voices were no longer heeded.

The basic idea of the UKK, attributed to Stalin, has been summarized as follows:

To link the ore of the Urals with the coal of Kuznetsk, or, speaking concretely, to build a series of new large factories for ferrous metallurgy, both in the Urals and the Kuznetsk Basin, and thereafter, in the same trains, to carry iron ore from the Urals to Kuzbas, and coal from the Kuzbas to the Urals.

. . . Heavy metallurgy, based on the iron ore of the Urals and the coal of Kuznetsk, linked in "pendulum fashion" by regularly scheduled trains in both directions—this is only the foundation of UKK. On this foundation, it has been necessary to create a complete cycle of heavy industry, including the production of not only ferrous, but also non-ferrous metals, as well as machine-building, chemical industry, transportation, and a net of electrical power stations.

. . . the large size of the factories in itself lowers the cost of production, and permits the coking of coal alongside metallurgical plants (as is the case in Magnitogorsk) and combines metallurgy with chemistry and the production of electric energy. This combination allows for the full utilization of raw materials.¹¹

The passage quoted above retraces faithfully, in summary form, the geo-political basis of Soviet planning as laid down by Stalin for the heavy industry of the USSR. This theory can properly be considered the very foundation of the entire planning system of the USSR, since heavy industry is the chief concern of Soviet industrialization, and most other branches of the economy are of secondary importance.

The peculiar feature of the UKK is that both coal and iron ore are transported to and from huge factories, located respectively in the Urals and the Kuznetsk Basin. The operation is carried on by rail over a distance of over 2,000 kilometers in each direction. As we have noted, it was originally thought that the size of the factories located in the Urals close to one basic source of raw material (ore)

¹¹N. N. Baransky, *Ekonomicheskaya geografiya SSSR*, 1948, p. 205.

would compensate for the enormous distance covered in bringing the coal from Kuznetsk. Inversely, it would become practical to feed huge factories located in the Kuznetsk Basin in the close vicinity of another basic raw material (coal), with ore carried the same prohibitive distance, but in the "same" trains.

It is not necessary to be an economic expert to see at first glance the basic weakness of the entire scheme: the unprecedented waste underlying the whole operation from its inception. But its true defects appear only after an analysis of the relevant statistical figures.

To the cost of mining the coal and ore, and that of processing the iron, a transportation cost of about 4,500 ton-kilometers per ton of iron is added both in the Ural and Kuznetsk factories.¹² This is not the whole story, however. From the beginning Soviet authorities were faced with two alternatives: they either had to build, at considerable cost, new factories on the spot, in Asia, and then to transport once again, the finished product over thousands of miles to European Russia or else they had to transport the iron ore itself to the older centers of production. In the case of Kuznetsk-Moscow, transportation cost of over 3,000 ton-kilometers per ton had to be faced. As the old centers of production continued in operation, the second of the two alternatives, that of transporting the iron, was adopted in most cases. As a result, new and additional burdens were imposed upon the already overtaxed railway system of the USSR.

Today, it is impossible to deny, even in Soviet Russia, the impracticality of the basic concepts of UKK, both from the standpoint of rational planning and that of cost. Thus, N. N. Baransky discussing the UKK¹³ writes as follows: "Heretofore, in the practice of capitalist countries a combination of coal with iron ore over a distance of 2,000 kilometers has come into existence in those cases alone, when a cheap water route was made available."

Moreover, by this time, intervening developments in air power and atomic energy in the West have greatly reduced, if not reversed, the purported strategic benefits of the UKK scheme. These, it will be recalled, were to be derived from the concentration of huge factories in a few broadly scattered centers of production, which all were to be so far removed from the point of probable enemy pene-

¹²H. Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, New York, 1950, p. 207, referring to Clark: *Some Economic Problems of the Soviet Iron and Steel Industry*, p. 15.

¹³N. N. Baransky, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

tration, as to make an attack, threatening to paralyze the nation's industry, virtually impossible. Continuous production in time of war would thus be assured.

The necessity of transporting enormous quantities of heavy freight over tremendous distances has absorbed for years, all the productive energies of Soviet railways; 30% of all the coal produced in the Soviet Union has gone up in smoke in the process.¹⁴ As a result, the Soviet government has been induced to adopt a further series of uneconomical and at first sight illogical decisions. These decisions were: (1) to limit railroad appropriations to a minimum, in favor of industrial construction; (2) to give preference to other means of transportation; i.e., water, automobile, and air transport;¹⁵ (3) to give preference to and to maintain at full capacity the major arteries of railway communications only.¹⁶

A check of Soviet budgetary figures will readily show the relatively low appropriations allowed for communications, as compared with the much larger sums made available for industrial purposes during the Soviet years:

<i>Budgetary Expenditures (Billions of rubles)</i>	<i>First 5-Year Plan (1928-1932)</i>	<i>Second 5-Year Plan (1933-1937)</i>	<i>Third 5-Year Plan (3 Years) (1938-1940)</i>
Total Budgets of which:	90.2	369.8	451.6
For Industry	26.3	75.4	83.3
For Communications	9.6	31.4	20.8

From 1928 to 1940, the Soviet State spent 185 billions for industry as against 61.8 billion for all communications, railroads included.

With relation to the budget as a whole, sums earmarked for industry showed a tendency towards increase, while expenditures on communications were losing ground. Thus in 1939, out of a total budget of 153.3 billion, 31.1 or 20.2% went to industry, while only 6.6, or 4.3% were allotted to communications.¹⁷ It should further be noted that during 1938-1940, a total of 119 billion was spent on industry out of the budget for armaments. At the same time, the expenditures for communications remained virtually unaffected

¹⁴T. Khachaturov, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷K. N. Plotnikov, *Biudzhët sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva*, 1948, p. 207.

(7.4 billion in 1938; 6.6 in 1939; and 6.8 in 1940, these figures including all forms of ground, air, and sea transport).

The inadequate performance of railroads which in turn was due to inadequacy of funds, as well as to the whole system of railroad planning was the chief reason which brought the XVIIIth Party Congress (1939) to resolve formally that railways were to be bypassed in favor of other means of transportation in budget appropriations. It was lack of funds and ineffectiveness which were also to bring about the third basic policy decision we have listed, *i.e.*, to concentrate on main arteries only. The practical results of the latter directive (no doubt, a highly unorthodox one from the engineer's standpoint) are today causing Soviet technicians much concern. The figures below will serve to illustrate this situation. In 1940, railways remained in the Soviet Union the principal means of transportation, carrying, during that year, 86% of all freight-loads (in ton-kilometers) and thus leaving only 14% to water, road, and air facilities combined. Between 1930 and 1940, lack of new construction together with an increase in freight movements of 310% increased the ratio between aggregate freight loads and aggregate mileage by 230%. Frequency of movement of trains over the same tracks also increased notably. Train speeds were pushed up by 50%. Despite this fact, both average train length and average train weight equally soared, and this tendency persisted after the war. Compared to 1940, the average train-weight was up by 10% in 1950, and the average freight carload by 14%.¹⁸

All these "advances" would represent highly welcome "achievements" if they had reflected technical progress rather than a heavy overloading of existing facilities. A study of Soviet sources will show that actually no such technical progress has taken place. That this is readily recognized by Soviet railway technicians can be seen from the following quotation: "Some transport engineers," writes V. Khachaturov in *Problems of Economics*, for August, 1951, "are of the opinion that great caution should be exercised in tackling the problem of increases both in speeds, and in freight loads per axle. They maintain that a so-called 'ratio' between the weight of the rails and that of the freight load allowed per axle should not fall below 2.4."

Following the government's line, Mr. Khachaturov pushes these doubts aside: "The truth is that no serious scientific foundation

¹⁸T. Khachaturov, *op. cit.*, pp. 36 ff.

whatsoever has been established, as yet, for the existence of a 'ratio' of that sort."

It remains a fact, however, that poor condition of many tracks on Soviet railroads, often combined with an inadequate volume of steel to the rail, constitute two of the major weaknesses of the contemporary Soviet railway system, considered as a whole. Urgent remedies are needed. To quote another Soviet economist, B. I. Levin:

In order to put an end to the state of neglect prevailing on the rail sector of the economy, and to cope with current replacements resulting from wear, the Law establishing the Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950 provides that, within five years, 50,000 kilometers of track must be laid with new rails inside the operating net alone, this figure not including rails needed for new construction.¹⁹

According to official statistics, the plan has remained unfulfilled on many railway lines.²⁰ Thus, the hazardous conditions existing on the railways of the USSR continued after the war.

Summing up, trains are running about 2½ times heavier, and 50% faster in the Soviet Union today, as compared to 1930, over a railway network increased by only about 30%,²¹ and not everywhere adequately reinforced.²²

Many trains are running unproductively, carrying cheap freight such as coal and iron on excessively long hauls. Thirty percent of all the nation's coal production is consumed in the process. More important still, railways are made available not in the populated areas where most needed, but in the scantily populated, and sometimes arid, areas of Siberia and Central Asia. This results in hard-

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁰B. Babelian, "Ispolzovat' rezervy povysheniya rentabilnosti zheleznnykh dorog," in: *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSR*, No. 4, 1951, pp. 323-324.

²¹This includes the territories of the Western Ukraine and Belorussia, annexed from Poland in 1939. Cf. T. Khachaturov, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²²It should be kept in mind that trains in Russia have at all times been running very slowly, some major lines excepted. Comparisons of speeds and weights over the years should therefore go back to pre-existing Russian standards, rather than conditions prevailing in Western Europe, or the U.S.A. Thus, in 1913, freight trains ran in Russia at an average speed of 8.4 miles an hour. The weight of a freight train was at that time 573 gross metric tons. The speed rose to 12.6 miles in 1940, while the weight of the average train went up to 1300 gross metric tons. This compares unfavorably, however, with an average haul of 1701 gross metric tons on the Erie Railroad in 1927. It is nowhere near the weight of an average train on the same American railroad in 1952, which amounted to 3102 gross metric tons. Gross ton mileage per train hour went up 140% on the Erie in the 25 years between 1927 and 1952. Cf. B. I. Levin, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

ship for many large and populated regions (chiefly in European Russia), at the expense of a few selected cities located in the wilderness, but encouraged and financed at great expense and with a deficit, in a fashion no market-supported economy based on profit and cost could ever endure.

The Soviet government's answer to this problem has not changed in the last twenty-five years. It remains industrialization at all cost, and without reprieve. More railways are not built, first, because they are expensive, and the government which is lacking funds,²³ will never borrow abroad. Second, because the government's system is not based on any concrete and organized modus of exchange between production and distribution, involving rentability of enterprise.²⁴

New railroads have been built at great cost, in distant provinces, at high waste of life (many were built by forced labor) with very small advantages accruing to local populations. Such a railway, the South-Siberian (another extension of the UKK) is being built now through the arid steppes of Turkestan, mainly by slave labor and prisoners of war.²⁵ On the other hand, where railroads have touched on populations living in already prosperous areas, and lead to further industrialization, such as in the Southern part of Russian Turkestan where cotton growing has been lavishly encouraged, a great general boom has resulted, and Soviet newspapers and magazines abound in enthusiastic reports from this prosperous sector. Construction, working conditions, and welfare have improved in this region blessed by Soviet planners. The same can be said, in part, of the Kuznetsk region.

The inconsistency of the over-all planning scheme, especially with regard to railroading, and the relatively poor over-all results, can be

²³A detailed appraisal of the mechanism of Soviet finances will be found in another chapter of the present author's forthcoming book, *The Soviet Union and the Business Cycle*.

²⁴Instances of irrational and uneconomical administration have been reported throughout the Soviet railway system. Bad planning and mismanagement are no doubt responsible for gross negligence and poor methods. Cf. B. Babelian, "Ispolzovat' rezervy povysheniya rentabilnosti zheleznnykh dorog," *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR*, vol. 4, Moscow, 1951, p. 326. Particularly interesting examples of inefficiency and waste in transportation, resulting from poor planning, will be found in a recent article by N. Tiunov: "Planirovanie i rezervy promyshlennogo proizvodstva," *Pravda*, April 5, 1953.

²⁵Cf. data published by the Information Section of NATO, as reported by *The New York Times*, June 27, 1952.

adequately appraised, however, only on a nation-wide scale, and in the perspective of the historical consequences of mistaken early decisions.²⁶

Current statistics confirm the Soviet government's continued unwillingness, or inability, to increase existing railway mileage to any notable extent. The Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950 listed only 4,492.5 miles of new railways.²⁷ Shying away from railway construction, the Soviet Union is turning more and more to waterways.²⁸ In order to remedy the situation it has arrived at with regard to transportation, it is now attempting to combine the building of canals with measures to relieve the agricultural crisis looming in the near future.²⁹ Such enterprises as the Volga-Don Canal are typical in this respect, since they strive to combine irrigation with new water-transport arteries of communication. The limits of this article will not permit the discussion of this subject and the current Soviet hopes to create a new communications system, efficient enough to allow for the hauling of Donbass coal by water to the Ural factories,³⁰ as well as to the Moscow region. Built at considerable cost, it does not appear excessively promising.³¹

²⁶It is now foreseen that the Kuznetsk basin will soon be entirely self-sufficient. This development, when it comes, will spell an end to the grand scheme of exchange of raw materials by rail "in pendulum fashion," between the Urals and Kuznetsk, and the whole of Kuzbass; UKK will cease to exist. Yet, coal will still have to be hauled to the Urals, either from Kuzbass, or from the Don region. Cf. N. N. Baransky, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

²⁷B. I. Levin, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

²⁸Most of the waterway routes, constructed after the Revolution, have seen slave labor and political prisoners utilized extensively. It was decided to recruit forced labor on a very large scale for the first time for the construction of the Belomorsky Canal, which completed the route from the Baltic to the White Sea. In recent years, slave labor has been increasingly used in the building of railroad track; for example, on various sectors of the Western Siberian, now under construction, prisoners, including prisoners of war, have been reported at various times working in great numbers.

²⁹Current efforts to combine the building of new waterways with that of electrical power stations and irrigation projects, even though they are usually represented by Soviet propaganda as a further development in Lenin's original COELRO scheme, reflect without any doubt the Soviet government's growing concern over a possibility of actual food shortages in the near future.

³⁰With the Kuznetsk industrial center expected to become self-sufficient in the very near future, the Ural steel factories, enlarged or built after the Revolution, will no longer be in a position to obtain coal from Kuznetsk on a relatively economical exchange basis for ore, and will become more isolated than ever.

³¹The Don is a very shallow river. Furthermore, prevailing differences in water

levels between the two rivers and the two seas (the Caspian is lower than the Black), have called for the erection of a large number of locks (13), along the canal's route (101 kilometers), and for the establishment of the main pumping stations on the Don. As a result, only flat river barges and minor river vessels will be able to use the new waterway. Their movement will be relatively costly and slow. Hauling goods all the way on such small ships is impractical, while loading and unloading at frequent intervals is very expensive. Cf. *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR*, vol. 4, 1951, pp. 390 ff.

On the Field of Kulikovo

BY ALEXANDER BLOK

Translated from the Russian

BY ROBIN KEMBALL

THE plain of Kulikovo lies between the Don and its tributary, the Nepriadva, some 200 miles to the south of Moscow. It was here, in 1380, that the first league of the Russian princes, under Dmitri Donskoi, Grand Duke of Vladimir and Moscow, met and defeated the Tatar Golden Horde. Just when the invaders seemed on the point of a crushing victory, one of Dmitri's regiments sprang out of the night, took the enemy by surprise, and completely routed them, their leader, the grand Khan Mamai, himself perishing during flight. (Cf. Part III of Blok's poem.)

The battle marks a turning-point in Russian history. For the first time ever, the Russian princes had formed a more or less united front against the Asian invader; Dmitri's brilliant victory did much to strengthen their self-confidence, and marked the dawning of a wider national consciousness that was to grow up under the leadership of Muscovy. Though, in the following year, the Tatars themselves surprised Dmitri, turning the tables and again forcing him into submission, it was yet clear that the Russians were henceforth willing and able to defend themselves, and could no longer, as in the past, be attacked with impunity on the basis of *divide et impera*.

Accounts of the Battle of Kulikovo show the influence of a Russian epic of much earlier standing—*The Lay of the Campaign of Igor* (c. 1185), which, by reason of its magnificent poetry, its rich symbolism, and vivid imagery, occupies a unique place in Russian literature. This prose-poem was, of course, known to Blok, and his own account also bears evident traces of its influence. Blok's poem was written in 1908.

I

The river stretches wide. It mourns, meanders, idly,
Lapping the banks. Beyond
The bare loam ochre cliffs, the haystacks sadly
Mourn in the steppe's despond.

O, Russ, my own! My wife, my own! To sorrow
Clear runs the long road still!
Our road—our breast, pierced with the agelong arrow
Of Tatar will.

Our road—the steppe, our road—in boundless longing,
Your longing, Russ, your tears!
Not even night—in shrouding mist and foreign—
Shall make me fear.

Come, night! Lead onward. Light the steppe-long distance—
One flaming trail.
From the steppe smoke, a sacred standard glistens
And Khanate sword of steel . . .

And endless battle! Sleep, we dream, but sample
Through blood and dust . . .
They speed, they speed, the steppe mare's hoofs, and trample
The coarse steppe grass . . .

No end! The versts flash by, the gorges flicker
And fade . . . Hold hard!
They swoop, they swoop, the storm-clouds, panic-stricken,
The sunset's blood!

The sunset's blood! With blood the heart is streaming!
Weep, heart, but weep . . .
And still, the steppe mare gallops, onward speeding!
There is no sleep!

II

Lone, we stood—the midnight steppe lay sleeping:
Not for us to turn, to look behind.
Over the Nepriadva, swans were shrieking,
And again, they shriek upon the wind . . .

By the road, a stone gleams—white and saddened.
Far across the stream—a pagan horde.
Never shall our regiment's bright standard
Hail again the victory of the sword.

Hear a friend, with head bowed earthward:—Sharper,
Soldier, whet your sword—his voice implores,
—Not to grapple vainly with the Tatar,
—Not to lie, slain in a sacred cause!

I am not the first—not the last soldier,
Long the land will languish, sick with strife.
Pray the morning for my soul's composure,
Dear my friend, serenely radiant wife!

III

Night came—o'er the steppe and by the bridges
Mamai's horde lay low,
We were with You on the darkened ridges—
Possibly You knew?

There, before the Don, dark and foreboding,
'Mid the fields of night,
Heard Your voice amid the swan's far shrieking
With prophetic heart.

Sudden, rose the army of the princes
From the midnight cloud,
Clinging to the stirrups, from the distance,
Mothers sobbed aloud.

Fowls hung hovering above the night in
Distant circling rings.
Silent, over Russia, sheets of lightning
Safeguarded the prince.

Eagles shrieked of doom above the Tatar
Camp—ill-omened tale,
And the fog lay, shrouding the Nepriadva
Like a bridal veil,

With the fog she slept in, the Nepriadva,
You swooped from the night
Straight at me—and never scared my charger—
Clothed in streaming light,

Shone upon Your darling—waves of silver
On my sabre's steel.
Freshly washed the dust from off my shoulder,
From my coat of mail.

When the horde moved, dark, upon the morning,
In my shield I saw
Fair Your face, and not of earthly forming,
Radiant evermore.

IV

Once more, with a hundred-year sighing,
The steppe grass lies trampled and trod.
Once more, from afar, you are crying,
The river lies shrouded in fog . . .

The steppe mares have bolted like thunder.
No trace—galloped off down the plain,
And savage, the passions loosed under
The yoke of the moon on the wane.

And I, with a hundred-year sighing,
A wolf 'neath the moon on the wane,
Know neither which way to go flying
Behind you, nor what's to be done!

I hear the swords clash in the tussle,
The bugles of Tatary, shrill,
I see, far afield, over Russia,
A carpet of flame, wide and still.

I trot on my faithful white charger,
My longing of infinite might . . .
The storm-clouds run free and together
In the height of the mist of the night.

There rise the most brilliant of visions
Through the torments that tear at my heart,
And fade—the most brilliant of visions,
Consumed in the fire of the dark . . .

—Come, teach me, then, marvel of marvels,
—To be brilliant, in deed as in thought!
Erect stands the mane of the charger . . .
On the wind comes the call of the sword . . .

*. . . and cast its shroud
Of inescapable disasters,
Forbidding, o'er the coming day.*

Vladimir Soloviev

V

Once more, the field of Kulikovo—
The mist has lifted, ebbd away,
Like some stern cloud, has cast its shadow,
Forbidding, o'er the coming day.

Behind the peace, in wakeless slumber,
Behind the teeming mist of night,
Unheard, the wondrous battle's thunder,
Unseen, the flashing of the fight.

But I shall know you, fateful dawning
Of days, momentous, turbulent!
Above the hostile camp, the storming
Still echoes, with the swans' lament.

The heart is restless, all unsettled.
The storm-clouds have not chanced this way.
The mail hangs heavy ere the battle.
Your hour has sounded.—Watch, and pray!

Plekhanov and the Origins of Russian Marxism*

BY SAMUEL H. BARON

IT was in the year of Karl Marx's death that Russian Marxism was born. In 1883, five people in Geneva, Switzerland, joining together as the "Emancipation of Labor" Group, launched the fateful movement that was to lead fifteen years later to the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, and was to have such phenomenal consequences in 1917 and thereafter. The outstanding leader of the new revolutionary organization was George Plekhanov, who is rightly called the "father of Russian Marxism."

It was not for lack of acquaintance with Marx's work that the Marxian movement began in Russia at this relatively late date. Literate Russians had had ample opportunity to familiarize themselves with Marxian ideas inasmuch as (1) the works of Marx and Engels were admitted freely into the country at mid-century and for some time thereafter, (2) *Das Kapital* was legally published in Russia in 1872 and sold well, (3) the revolutionary underground published illegally other works of Marx and Engels in the seventies and eighties, and (4) Marxian writings were not infrequently discussed in the periodical press. Leading Russian thinkers, such as Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, Lavrov, Bakunin, Tkachev, and Mikhailovsky, all had knowledge of some of Marx's works, and several of them had high praise for some aspects of Marxian thought.¹ The important revolutionary organization, *Narodnaya Volya* (The People's Will), wrote to Marx in 1880: "The class of advanced intelligentsia in Russia, always attentively following the ideological development of Europe and sensitively reacting to it, has met the appearance of your works with enthusiasm."²

*A slightly condensed version of this article was read at the 1952 meeting of the Southern Historical Association in Knoxville, Tennessee. [Ed.]

¹For a good account of Marxian ideas in Russia prior to the formation of the "Emancipation of Labor" Group, see B. A. Chagin, *Proniknovenie idei Marksizma v Rossiyu*, Leningrad, 1948. With regard to Chernyshevsky's acquaintance with Marxian ideas, V. Shulgin, "K voprosu o proniknovenii Marksizma v Rossiyu v 40-60 godakh XIX veka," *Istoriia Marksist*, Nos. 5-6, 1939, pp. 171-3.

²Ispolnitelnyi Komitet Sotsial-Revolutsionnoi Partii v Rossii, November 7,

But if advanced Russians had had a considerable exposure to Marxism, if various persons had a warm respect for Marx and some of his ideas, prior to 1883, Russian thinkers familiar with that system of thought agreed in failing to accept a thorough-going Marxism with its economic, political, sociological, and philosophical implications. Radical Russians had not taken Marx's ideas as a basis for their revolutionary activity for, in general, they considered that, while Marx had laid bare the roots and workings of capitalist states, his diagnosis and prognostications were inapplicable to Russia. It was rather the doctrines of populism (*narodnichestvo*) that held almost universal sway in Russian socialist circles. Marxism began to win adherents only when, as a consequence of repeated failures of populist movements to attain their ends, faith in the ideas and methods of those movements weakened. Then there was resumed that quest for "an algebra of revolution" that had engaged advanced Russians for decades. In the course of this renewed quest, Plekhanov, who had been an enthusiastic populist in the first years of his revolutionary career, was drawn to Marxian thought, which appeared to him to offer a more realistic and practicable basis for the Russian revolution. A study of his experience and of the development of his ideas with respect to Russia's social evolution reveals Plekhanov's reasons for abandoning populist views in favor of a Marxian approach. But the lessons that Plekhanov drew from his experience and studies had more than a personal significance; they provided the rationale for defections of other revolutionists from the populist ranks and for the consequent buildup of the Russian Marxian movement.

In 1874, the young nobleman Plekhanov was a brilliant, first-year student at the Mining Institute in Petersburg. In that turbulent decade, the universities were hotbeds of revolutionary propaganda. The times were such that a classroom could be used for a revolutionary meeting, while a professor acquiesced in such activity by foregoing a scheduled lecture.³ Under such conditions, Plekhanov, like so many other youths, was drawn into revolutionary activity and, gradually, he abandoned his studies. The sentiments he felt when, as a neophyte revolutionist, he encountered his first repre-

1880, *Perepiska K. Marksa i F. Engelsa s Russkimi politicheskimi-deyateliymi*, 1947, p. 206.

³Such an incident is recounted in an autobiographical article by D. Blagoev, "Kratkie vospominaniya iz moei zhizni," *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 1, 1927, p. 88.

sentative of the masses illustrate well both the romantic nature of the populists and the gulf that tragically separated them from those they yearned to help.

When I met Mitrofanov for the first time [he wrote] and recognized that he was a . . . representative of the people, in my soul there stirred a feeling of compassion. . . . I very much wanted to converse with him but did not know how and with what expressions. . . . It seemed to me that the language of . . . [the student] would be incomprehensible to this son of the people . . . and that I would have to use the absurd manner of speech of our revolutionary pamphlets.⁴

By December, 1876, Plekhanov, then an agitator for the revolutionary organization "Land and Liberty" (*Zemlya i Volya*), was prepared to burn his bridges behind him. In that month, he addressed an illegal demonstration of students and workers on the Kazan Square in Petersburg.⁵ The meeting was broken up by the police and, in order to escape arrest, Plekhanov fled abroad. Thereafter, he was wanted by the authorities; when in his native land, he was obliged to remain incognito.⁶

Some months later, when he returned to Russia, Plekhanov showed unexampled energy for the cause of rebellion. The broad scope of his activity as an agitator can be seen in the series of revolutionary proclamations—the first products of his pen—which he addressed to students, workers, Cossacks, and "educated society."⁷ His vigor and talent soon brought him to a position of leadership in the then dominant populist organization, "Land and Liberty"; and, early in 1879, he was made an editor of its periodical publication.

But even in 1879, while Plekhanov was a populist, he was a populist with a difference. His first revolutionary assignment had foreshadowed his future rôle, for it involved propaganda not among

⁴G. V. Plekhanov, "Russkii rabochii v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii," *Sochineniya*, Moscow-Leningrad, 2nd ed., 1924, III, p. 127.

⁵Plekhanov's account of this appears in *ibid.*, pp. 62-65.

⁶Material relating to Plekhanov's early revolutionary career may be found in the following sources: *ibid.*; numerous memoirs of L. Deutsch, R. M. Plekhanov and others in *Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda"*, Moscow, 1924-28, 6 vols.; O. Aptekman, *G. V. Plekhanov*, Leningrad, 1925; L. Deutsch, "Kak Plekhanov stal Marksistom," *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 7, 1922; L. Deutsch, "O sblizhenii i razryve s Narodovoltzami," *ibid.*, No. 8, 1923; L. Tikhomirov, *Plekhanov i ego druž'ya*, Leningrad, 1925.

⁷A series of these proclamations appear in *Literaturnoe nasledie G. V. Plekhanova*, Moscow, 8 vols., 1934-40, I.

the peasants but among the Petersburg workmen.⁸ The aim of the populists in mingling with the workmen was to recruit propagandists for activity among the peasants, those who were expected to provide the mass basis for the revolution. But in order to win the confidence of the workers, the revolutionists had to take part in the workers' struggles. Thus Plekhanov came to participate in strikes, to share the experiences of the workers, and to write propaganda and manifestoes for them. While those who were trying to activate the peasants were having little success, Plekhanov obtained a positive response from the workers among whom he carried on agitation. The significance of this was not lost upon him and, even as a populist, he pointed to the socialist inclinations of the city worker and to the useful rôle that the latter might play in the social revolution.⁹

Early in 1879, there appeared in the journal, *Land and Liberty*, a long article in which Plekhanov detailed his populist views.¹⁰ He expected that Russia would soon produce a great revolution, a revolution that would establish an anarcho-socialist order. The revolution would be consummated when the intelligentsia, dissatisfied as it was with the political and social order, would, by agitation, succeed in arousing the great mass of discontented peasants and in directing their fury against the existing régime. The revolution would bring the destruction of the state and the distribution of state and noble lands among the peasants. The character of the new society would be determined by the anarcho-collectivist nature of the peasants who were the overwhelming majority of the Russian people. The age-long desire of the peasant for freedom and self-government would lead to the destruction of the coercive, centralized state and its replacement, from the bottom up by a "free federation of free communes." Since the peasants were organized in collectivist-type communes, it was deduced that the future society would be collectivist in nature, with property collectively owned and with production, whether agricultural or industrial, organized on a collectivist basis.¹¹ Although much was left unsaid, it was clear that, to Plekhanov's way of thinking, Russia would attain socialism through the revolutionary action of the

⁸Plekhanov recalls these experiences in "Russkii rabochii v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii," *op. cit.*

⁹Plekhanov, "Zakon ekonomicheskogo razvitiya obshchestva i zadachi sotsializma v Rossii," *Sochineniya*, I, p. 70.

¹⁰The article is cited in the preceding footnote.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 62-5.

peasantry and without passing through a capitalist stage of development.

This general scheme was by no means peculiar to Plekhanov, the influence of Bakunin is all too clear, and some such outlook was common to most of the revolutionary populists of the period 1876-1879. But what is arresting about Plekhanov's analysis is that in 1879, he already showed concern that his system should be consistent with Marxian principles as he then understood them. Thus he said: "Let us see to what the teaching of Marx obligates us . . . in view of the necessity of establishing the points of departure of our program."¹² Unlike other Russian populists, he argued that Marxian principles were relevant not only to capitalist societies, but to all societies. However, this did not signify that all societies must have identical histories; for, "weaving and combining variously in various societies, they [Marxian principles] give entirely dissimilar results. . . ."¹³

It was significant that the article under consideration was entitled "The Law of the Economic Development of Society and the Tasks of Socialism in Russia." The title suggested, and the contents of the article confirmed, that Plekhanov was at one with Marx in identifying "the economic history of society" as the determining factor in social evolution.¹⁴ He held up to criticism the "utopian" socialists of the thirties and forties who, considering the mind all and life nothing, had supposed that a happily-conceived plan for a well-proportioned and smoothly-functioning society could, by virtue of skillful use of propaganda, be translated into reality without reference to the stage of economic development existing at a given time and place.¹⁵ Arguing, in effect, that his own populist views could not be described as utopian, Plekhanov insisted that the peasant commune was stable, that its collective ownership of land and the collectivist habits of work and thought that it created among the peasants provided a real and sound basis for socialism in Russia.¹⁶ If Russia differed from the West in this regard, if Russia could attain socialism in a unique way, it was only because the peasant commune had fallen in the West, and with it, the collectivist instincts of the people. When those instincts were replaced by individualism, the

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 57-8.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 61, 62, 65.

possibility of socialism in the West vanished until such time as the growth of large-scale, factory production with its socialization of labor had once again restored the social spirit that had decayed with the decay of the commune.¹⁷ The very cornerstone of Plekhanov's system, then, was the belief that the commune provided the basis for Russian socialism, and that the commune "does not bear within itself the elements of its own doom."¹⁸ In terms of his own theoretical premises, it followed that if the commune should disintegrate, the social conditions essential for the establishment of socialism would no longer obtain in Russia and, in that case, only a utopian could speak of the likelihood of socialism there in the near future.

The early influence of Marx upon him is important in helping to explain Plekhanov's later, definitive, conversion to Marxism; but it is clear that, in 1879, the young revolutionist did not qualify as a Marxist. Plekhanov believed that Marxian principles supported the outlook and program of the populists. But this was, at least in part, an erroneous judgment; for Plekhanov, like most of the populists of that time, considered that the revolution would destroy the state and open the way to an anarcho-federalist order, while Marxists held that a state, and a strongly-centralized state, was essential for the transition to socialism. Very shortly before the publication of the article discussed above, he had described all of Russian history not as "the history of class struggle," but, in anarchist terms, as "an unbroken struggle of the state with the commune and the individual."¹⁹ And so poorly oriented was Plekhanov in questions of Western socialism that he grouped Marx and Engels with Rodbertus and Dühring as "the brilliant pleiade" of socialism, in 1879,²⁰ that is, a year after Engels had published his celebrated attack upon Dühring.

Nevertheless, Plekhanov's exposure to some Marxian ideas clearly had produced a strong impression upon him. For the present, he could both be a good populist and be faithful to Marxian precepts, as he then understood them, since there seemed to him to be no contradiction between the two. But in time, his faith in the populist creed was shaken, while a more extensive contact with the primary sources of Marxism strengthened his conviction as to the

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁹Plekhanov, "Korrespondentsii," *ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁰Plekhanov, "Zakon ekonomicheskogo razvitiya obshchestva," *ibid.*, p. 57.

validity of that outlook. Within a very few years, he became persuaded of the essential incompatibility of populism with Marxism; and this led to his renunciation of populism.

When within "Land and Liberty" there developed a strong tendency to abandon agitation among the peasants and workmen in favor of a terroristic, political struggle with the government, Plekhanov led the fight against the terrorists. When dissension within "Land and Liberty" led to its dissolution in the fall of 1879, Plekhanov became a leader of the new, anti-terrorist organization, "The General Redivision" (*Chernyi Peredel*), which, in opposition to the terrorist "People's Will," affirmed its adherence to the traditional views and methods of "Land and Liberty."²¹ But Plekhanov's faith in the old populist outlook was soon weakened by the failure of "The General Redivision" to compete successfully with the terrorists in attracting fresh forces. When even those who remained loyal to the old populist ideas showed little inclination to carry propaganda to the countryside,²² doubts arose in Plekhanov's mind as to the correctness of the views of the "redivisionists."

Around the same time, his doubts were compounded by his encounter with Orlov's book, *Communal Property in the Moscow District*. Orlov presented such persuasive data on the decline of the peasant commune, that Plekhanov was obliged to revise his opinion concerning its indestructibility. Soon afterward he acknowledged that economic differentiation was proceeding among the commune members, that the commune "is being divided into two parts, each of which is hostile to the other. . . ."²³ Yet, he insisted that the causes of the decline of the commune were external²⁴ and that they would cease to operate if the socialists should succeed in igniting the revolution, if they should bring the peasants "from a passive expectation of a general redivision" to "an active demand for it."²⁵ For the moment, Plekhanov seemed able to reassure himself, but he reported later that Orlov's work "strongly shook" his populist convictions.²⁶ By raising serious doubts about the stability of the com-

²¹Plekhanov, "Stat'i iz 'Chernogo Peredela,'" *ibid.*, p. 108.

²²Plekhanov, "Kak i pochemu my razoshlis s redaktsiei 'Vestnika Narodnoi Voli,'" *ibid.*, XIII, 25.

²³Plekhanov, "Pozemelnaya obshchina i ee veroyatnoe budushchee," *ibid.*, I, 102.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 103.

²⁵Plekhanov, "Stat'i iz 'Chernogo Peredela,'" *ibid.*, p. 117.

²⁶Plekhanov, "Russkii rabochii v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii," *ibid.*, III, p. 197.

mune, the book tended to undermine the very foundation of his populist outlook.

As uncertainty came to take the place of conviction, Plekhanov began to deplore the inadequacy of his knowledge and the difficulty of supplementing it under the repressive conditions of Russian life.²⁷ Hence, he was not entirely displeased when, late in 1879, some of his revolutionary comrades urged that he and other leaders of "The General Redivision" go abroad until such time as the situation was more auspicious for revolutionary work.²⁸ Plekhanov welcomed the opportunity to secure the information which would quiet his doubts and verify his views. Half in jest, he remarked that he was going abroad "to study and to attain there the scholarly level of a master's or a doctor's degree."²⁹

In January, 1880, Plekhanov made his way to western Europe and immediately plunged into the study of history, political science, and socialism.³⁰ The works of Marx fascinated him and, in order to gain more complete access to them, Plekhanov undertook to learn German.³¹ Beginning in the fall of 1880, he lived in Paris for almost a year, engaging in intensive study at the *Bibliothèque Nationale* and, in his spare time, making the acquaintance of such leaders of Western socialism as Jules Guesde. His sojourn in the West made a profound impression upon Plekhanov. Experience of Western conditions and increased familiarity with Western socialist political and economic conceptions gave him the perspective for a critique of "Russian socialism." Thus his trip abroad had unexpected results, inasmuch as he did not acquire information that could bolster the populist position; on the contrary, for as Plekhanov recalled many years afterwards, "the more we became acquainted with the theories

²⁷L. Deutsch, "Kak Plekhanov stal Marksistom," *op. cit.*, p. 117.

²⁸Marx commented pungently on the appearance in western Europe of the "redivisionists," the majority of whom, he said, had "abandoned Russia voluntarily—in contrast to the terrorists whose heads were at stake—to form a propaganda party. In order to carry on propaganda in Russia, they come to Geneva. How is that for a *quid pro quo*?" The "redivisionists" were accused of a whole catalogue of sins. Yakovlev, *Iz istorii politicheskoi bor'by v 70-kh i 80-kh gg. XIX veka*, Moscow, 1912, p. 470. Thus cordially did Marx, in 1880, welcome those who, a few years later, were to inaugurate the Marxian movement in Russia.

²⁹P. B. Akselrod, *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe*, Berlin, 1923, p. 347.

³⁰His notebook for the years 1880-1882 is crammed full of titles which he evidently consulted. "Zapisnaya knizhka G. V. Plekhanova," *Literaturnoe nasledie G. V. Plekhanova*, I.

³¹L. Deutsch, "Kak Plekhanov stal Marksistom," *op. cit.*, p. 120.

of scientific socialism, the more doubtful became our populism to us, from the side of both theory and practice."³² The changes effected in his views were soon evident and, indeed, it is possible to trace, in his writings between 1880 and 1882, Plekhanov's rejection, one after another, of the fundamental theses of populism. In a period of fifteen to eighteen months he renounced the doctrine of a unique social evolution for Russia, abandoned hostility to politics and political struggle, and ceased to identify the peasantry as the mass basis of the Russian socialist revolution.

By September, 1880 (nine months after he had gone abroad), Plekhanov was contending that the next stage for Russia would probably be a bourgeois-constitutional régime.³³ This judgment, dropped rather casually in an article, revealed the profound change that had taken place in Plekhanov's outlook in a short time. It signified that Russia would not have a unique social development, involving a leap from her contemporary situation to a socialist order, but instead would experience an intervening capitalist stage. But Plekhanov was not yet prepared to make these affirmations. That for him the situation was not yet entirely crystallized was apparent when he indicated that while the agrarian question was still the chief concern of the socialists, "Russian industry is not standing still." And "along with this, the center of gravity of economic questions is being transferred to the industrial centers."³⁴ By January, 1881, the idea that the next socio-political formation for Russia would be a bourgeois-constitutional régime had passed from probability to certainty for Plekhanov.³⁵ While the implication was unavoidable that Russia's economic evolution would therefore parallel that of the West, it was only at the end of 1881 that Plekhanov unequivocally stated that Russia was launched on the capitalist phase of development and that "all other routes are closed to her."³⁶

The adoption of the point of view described above meant that Plekhanov no longer regarded the peasant commune as a basis for a direct transition to socialism; but nothing was said of this, nor were detailed and reasoned arguments given for his change of front before

³²Plekhanov, "Kak i pochemu my razoshlis s redaktsiei 'Vestnika Narodnoi Voli,'" *op. cit.*, p. 26.

³³Plekhanov, "Stat'i iz 'Chernogo Peredela,'" *op. cit.*, pp. 124-5.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 131.

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 134-5.

³⁶Plekhanov-Lavrov, End of 1881, *Literaturnoe nasledie G. V. Plekhanova*, VIII, 210.

the publication of his important works of 1883 and 1885 respectively, *Socialism and Political Struggle* and *Our Disagreements*.³⁷ In those works, and especially in the latter, it became clear that additional study of Russian economic data, on the one hand, and on the other, mastery of Marxian economic theory had led him to formulate his new conception of Russian social evolution.

Plekhanov's new convictions concerning Russian social development led to a revision of his views as to the tactics the socialists must follow. Although they worked for the destruction of the state, the populists, prior to the formation of "The People's Will," did not regard theirs as a political fight. As anarchists, they were opposed to political struggle, since such a struggle signified to them the acceptance of the state principle. Their aim was not to win political rights within the state system, not to reform that system, nor even to capture the state and utilize it for the implementation of their social program. They sought an end to all states, since the latter were considered instruments of coercion and oppression. The members of "Land and Liberty," and of "The General Redivision" after it, believed that their socialist convictions—for they were anarcho-socialists—obliged them to devote all their energies to agitation among the masses, revolving around their *economic* needs. Only in consequence of such activity would there be called into being the popular rising that would destroy the state and permit the development of the anarcho-socialist order. The populists thought that political liberty was intimately associated with, and beneficial mainly to, the bourgeoisie; political freedom and the struggle to attain it had little or no relevance, they thought, to the needs of peasant Russia—needs which were preeminently economic.

Plekhanov had shared these views, but in September, 1880, he wrote: "We know the value of political liberty . . . ; we greet every struggle for the rights of man."³⁸ If this was a notable departure from his earlier views, Plekhanov, as yet, was prepared to accord to political struggle and political liberty only a secondary importance.³⁹ He still urged that the people everywhere and always were concerned about economic rather than political questions. Therefore, if the socialists were to become a power, and if the people were to register gains at the time of a revolution, the socialists must carry on agitation among the peasants centered around economic demands. This

³⁷These works are reproduced in *Sochineniya*, II.

³⁸Plekhanov, "Stat'i iz 'Chernogo Peredela,'" *op. cit.*, p. 125.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 127.

would guarantee that with the coming of a revolutionary crisis, the socialists would not constitute a "staff without an army," but instead, would have massed forces behind them sufficient to ensure consideration of the popular needs.⁴⁰ If, on the other hand, the socialists should be drawn into a political struggle against absolutism, they would lose contact with the economically-minded masses, and the latter, lacking awareness, unity, and leadership, would gain little or nothing from the overthrow of absolutism.⁴¹

Plekhanov, in common with many other populists, was still inclined to treat politics and economics as mutually exclusive, unrelated spheres; but for Plekhanov, this situation did not last. In January, 1881, advancing another step toward what was to be his life-long position, he articulated, although yet imperfectly, that synthesis of political struggle and socialism which was to be one of his major contributions to Russian revolutionary thought.⁴² In the ensuing months, he clarified his thinking further and, in the spring of 1882, in his foreword to the second Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, Plekhanov plainly enunciated a social-democratic strategy.⁴³ It was indeed appropriate that he should have done so at that time and in that place, for within the *Communist Manifesto* appeared the formula toward which he had been groping. No longer did he place "political struggle" (the fight for political rights and political hegemony) in opposition to socialist activity (agitation among the masses designed immediately to bring the destruction of the state and a socio-economic revolution). Plekhanov had come to believe that "political struggle" and "socialist activity," so far from being mutually exclusive, were intimately inter-related, that neither could be overlooked in favor of the other, that only *by way of* political struggle could socialism be attained. Plekhanov commended the *Manifesto* as a corrective to the one-sidedness of those socialists who, like the members of "Land and Liberty" and "The General Redivision," opposed political activity, and of those, like the partisans of "The People's Will," who became so engulfed in the political struggle against absolutism as to forget about the creation of a mass movement, which alone could ensure the future of the socialist party.⁴⁴

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 135-6.

⁴³Plekhanov, "Predislovie k Russkomu izdaniyu 'Manifesta Kommunisticheskoi Partii,'" *ibid.*, pp. 150-51.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

Plekhanov's premises were these: Even though the coming upheaval be a bourgeois rather than a socialist revolution, the masses have much at stake. With the fall of absolutism, they should win political rights which would greatly increase the possibilities for developing the campaign for economic emancipation, for socialism. The tactic that Plekhanov recommended to the Russian socialists, therefore, was much the same as that which Marx had urged upon the German Communists in 1848. The socialists must fight alongside of the bourgeoisie to the extent that it is revolutionary in its struggle with absolute monarchy, but, at the same time, must not for a moment slacken its drive to develop in the minds of the workers the clearest possible consciousness of the antagonism of the interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.⁴⁵ The Russian socialists must draw the workers into the struggle against absolutism as allies of the bourgeoisie, but must make plain to the proletariat that its interests dictated the inauguration of an all-out struggle against the bourgeoisie on the morrow of the overthrow of absolutism.

Finally, it followed that, if capitalism was to dominate the economic life of Russia, the proletariat, that inevitable by-product of capitalist development, rather than the peasantry, would provide the mass basis for the socialist revolution. In September, 1880, when he first suggested that Russia stood on the eve of a bourgeois revolution, Plekhanov advised that propaganda for factory workers be published.⁴⁶ However, through most of 1881, his uncertainty was reflected in the continued reference to "the toilers" and "the people" as the chief support of the socialists. But, at the end of 1881, around the same time that he imparted to the venerable Russian revolutionary leader, Lavrov, his conviction that Russia could not escape capitalist development, he designated the city workers as the only group from which something significant could be expected in the revolutionary movement.⁴⁷ Thus, if earlier he had seen socialism coming to Russia by way of a peasant revolution, on the basis of the peasant commune, and without a prior stage of capitalist development, Plekhanov now argued that the socialist revolution was thinkable only after a considerable period of capitalism, which would

⁴⁵K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, New York, International Publishers, p. 43.

⁴⁶Plekhanov, "Ob izdanii Russkoi Sotsialno-Revolyutsionnoi Biblioteki," *Sochineniya*, I, 145-6.

⁴⁷Plekhanov-Lavrov, November, 1881, *Literaturnoe nasledie Plekhanova*, VIII, 208.

produce both the productive system requisite for a socialist economy and the proletariat, the class which would overthrow the capitalist system and inaugurate the socialist order.

Plekhanov's evolution had brought him to a position which represented an innovation in Russian revolutionary thought; at the same time, it represented a triumph for the Western statement of the socialist problem. He was now convinced that "in Russian history, there is no essential difference from the history of Western Europe."⁴⁸ Consequently, he maintained that the problems of the Russian socialists could best be illuminated by the study of west European social development and Western socialist teachings. Plekhanov thus took his place in the tradition of the Russian "Westernizers." As Peter the Great had applied military and administrative techniques to Russia, as the Decembrists and the men of the thirties and forties had hoped to "westernize" Russia in the political sense, now Plekhanov adopted a Western version of socialism and set out to make it the ruling socialist tendency. As Peter had fought the tradition-bound clergy and boyars, as the "Westernizers" of the time of Nicholas I had done battle with the Slavophiles, now Plekhanov undertook to demolish Russian, populist socialism. Now he declared that he was ready to make of Marx's *Capital* "a Procrustean bed" for the leaders of the revolutionary movement.⁴⁹

In early 1881, as a result of an apparent convergence of views of the "redivisionists" and the terrorists, collaboration between the two factions had been suggested by Plekhanov.⁵⁰ Some months later, when collaboration had in fact been established, Plekhanov's views once again diverged from those of the terrorists as he moved toward Marxism. Although for two years the factions were in uneasy association, it was apparent that each was trying to use the other. The "redivisionists" (now become Marxists) wished to capitalize on the popularity of "The People's Will," while trying to infuse that organization with a new social-democratic content.⁵¹ The terrorists intended to turn the well-known names and the experience and talents of the former "redivisionists" to their advantage without, however, allowing the social democrats to gain a predominant voice in the organization.⁵² The differences between

⁴⁸Plekhanov-Lavrov, Early 1882, *Ibid.*, p. 211.

⁴⁹Plekhanov-Lavrov (Probably early spring, 1882), *Dela i Dni*, 1921, Vol. II, 91.

⁵⁰Plekhanov, "Stat'i iz 'Chernogo Peredela,'" *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁵¹Deutsch-Akselrod, June 15, 1883, *Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda,"* I, 165, 168-9.

⁵²This inference is based on Iochelson's letter in *Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda"* v

the two factions were so great that they could not live in connubial bliss; nor did one succeed in assimilating the other. Plekhanov and his comrades proved unwilling to sacrifice their principles for the sake of unity, while the terrorists showed themselves unwilling to accommodate themselves to Plekhanov's "Procrustean bed."⁶³ But if Plekhanov's circle had failed in its attempt to win over the revolutionary movement from within, its members then resolved to create a new revolutionary organization for the propaganda of their ideas. When, in September, 1883, they founded the "Emancipation of Labor" Group, it was in order to take over the leadership of the revolutionary movement and thus, in the end, to stamp the imprint of Marx's thinking deep into Russian life.

Period 1883-1894 gg. ed. V. I. Nevsky (Istoriko-revoliutsionnyi sbornik, II, Leningrad, 1924) pp. 402-3; Plekhanov, "Kak i pochemu my razoshlis s redaktsiei 'Vestnika Narodnoi Voli,'" *op. cit.*, p. 33; Tikhomirov-Lavrov, August 6, 1883, *Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda,"* I, 250.

⁶³Materials relative to the relations between "redivisionists" and terrorists may be found in *Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda,"* I, III; "Pisma G. V. Plekhanova k P. L. Lavrovu," *Dela i Dni*, Vol. II, 1921; Deutsch, "O sblizhenii i razryve s Narodovoltzami," *op. cit.*; Plekhanov, "Pochemu i kak my razoshlis s redaktsiei 'Vestnika Narodnoi Voli,'" *op. cit.*; L. Tikhomirov, *Vospominaniya Lea Tikhomirova*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927.

A Soviet Planner—V. G. Groman

BY NAUM JASNY

AN important page in the history of the Russian intelligentsia is fading into oblivion through the efforts of the Soviet government and the neglect of the opposing camp.

By the time Lenin's attempt at introducing Communism, by way of obtaining from the peasants a few million tons of grain gratis and distributing it among factories, collapsed in the great famine of 1921-22, or soon thereafter, most political leaders opposing the régime, were abroad. Those interested in the economy, however, remained in the USSR. Indeed, at least two prominent men, N. P. Makarov and A. N. Chelintsev, came back (Makarov from the United States) to participate in the reconstruction of Russia from the ruins.

The Narodniki faction, or, as they were called, the neo-Narodniki, naturally concentrated on research in agriculture. Under the very able leadership of N. D. Kondratiev, the Narodniki almost monopolized research and planning in the Commissariat of Agriculture. N. P. Makarov, A. V. Chayanov, A. N. Chelintsev, Albert Weinstein, and A. A. Rybnikov were among the other important names. Kondratiev was also director of the Institute of Current Observation of the Commissariat of Finance and editor of its very important *Bulletins*. On its staff the Institute had also a number of first-rate mathematical statisticians, who upheld the great reputation Russia had enjoyed in this field.

The Mensheviks turned their eyes to the industry and economy as a whole. They played a considerable rôle in the field of theory, and had a very great influence in practical economics. Now, in retrospect, the Russia of the NEP certainly does not look like the realization of the ideal of democratic socialism. It was far from this even to the contemporaries. Yet almost all large-scale industry was in the hands of the state, and so was all banking and foreign trade, and almost all wholesale trade. A large part of the retail trade was operated by the state or the cooperatives. There certainly was a vast field for work, especially until Stalin could get rid of all his enemies inside the Party and could pay more attention to operating the entire national economy.

The Menshevik A. M. Ginsburg directed the planning work in

the Supreme Council of National Economy. But the great stronghold of the Menshevik forces was the Gosplan, with V. G. Groman as a leading light. From 1923 to 1927, inclusive, this group dominated the current planning and had a profound influence also on the First Five-Year Plan. The extremely important milestones of Soviet planning, *The Control Figures of the National Economy of the USSR* for 1925-26, 1926-27, and 1927-28, were almost entirely the work of the Groman group.

V. A. Bazarov, a follower of Bogdanov, but in agreement with Groman in practical problems, was Groman's closest collaborator. Among the others may be mentioned B. A. Gukhman, N. N. Vishnevsky, G. V. Shub, and V. I. Zeilinger—all Mensheviks.

V. P. Milyutin, a leading Communist, in his report "On Counter-revolutionary Wrecking in Agriculture" at the meeting of the Agrarian Institute of the Communist Academy, October 1, 1930, thus described this group of non-Communist intelligentsia:

Those agents of world capitalism and of the domestic bourgeoisie among us selected specific methods of fighting. They occupied responsible positions, many of them top positions in our central governmental organizations. Groman was a member of the Presidium of the Gosplan; Kondratiev played an important rôle in the Commissariats of Finance and Agriculture for a long time; Makarov held a responsible position in the Commissariat of Agriculture; for a long time Sukhanov did responsible work in the Commissariats of Trade and Agriculture; Sadyrin was a member of the Central Executive Committee; Yurovsky played a dominant rôle in the Commissariat of Finance and was a member of its Presidium. . . .¹

In 1928, with the NEP drawing to an end, Groman was dropped from the Gosplan, Kondratiev was deprived of the control of his Institute, Yurovsky (apparently in 1929) was fired from the Commissariat of Finance, and so on. By the end of 1930, almost everybody (only one exception is known to me) was taken off the active list, even those who had accepted the collectivization drive before being put in jail. The Menshevik trial, early in 1931, with Groman as the main defendant and Kondratiev as the star witness, was the wind-up of a glorious era.

The time for shooting of Stalin's enemies had not yet arrived. If any of the named and unnamed anti-Communists who were active in the economic life of the twenties lost his life, this probably occurred later. But a whole generation of the intelligentsia disap-

¹The Agrarian Institute of the Communist Academy, *Kondratievshchina*, Moscow, 1930, p. 7.

peared without a trace, and the country was deprived of the opportunity to profit from their talents and their experience.²

In the late twenties, planning of the national economy implemented through compulsion replaced planning by methods which, with certain exceptions, would have been acceptable in democratic countries. In direct connection with this fundamental change of policy, the Gosplan and other state economic agencies were cleared not only of those opposed to the new methods, but also of those not fully enthusiastic about them. While Communists received a mild treatment (Krzhizhanovsky, the President of the Gosplan of the USSR and a personal friend of Lenin, and Strumilin, primarily responsible for the First Five-Year Plan, were relegated to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR); non-Communists, with only one exception known to me, L. B. Kafengaus, simply disappeared.

Vladimir Gustavovich Groman, member of the Presidium of the Gosplan and "Distinguished Worker of Science" (this was the highest title bestowed upon Soviet scholars then) was the one most abused. The extreme viciousness of the attacks upon him only shows how high he stood as a planner, fighter, and man.

It may be thought that I am prejudiced in favor of Groman. Hence, rather than speaking myself, I will quote the editors of *Courier of Statistics*, a scientific journal of the Central Statistical Office of the USSR. The occasion was the thirtieth anniversary of the statistical and scientific work of V. G. Groman (he was fifty-two years old then). Only relatively short extracts from the lengthy eulogy can be reproduced here.³

Russian statistics, whether in the field of statistical practice or that of statistical theory, includes many great names. One of the most prominent is that of Vladimir Gustavovich, who is renowned not only as an original scholar but as a remarkable person as well. One may disagree with V. G. Groman, one may fight with him on this or that issue, but even in extreme disagreement one cannot help but fall under the spell of his exceptional charm and his brilliant mind. The most striking characteristics of Vladimir Gustavovich are his boundless, bursting vitality and the breadth of his national-economic approach to all the problems which he attacks. Vladimir Gustavovich is incapable of thinking piece-meal, in scraps; such thinking is organically alien to him. His thought is

²Other urgent tasks prevent this writer from undertaking a history of this important period. For some time he has been working on a monograph on Soviet planning, in which the activities of the Groman-Bazarov group are to be given their due. In this article the author is happy to have an opportunity to publish a short statement on Groman.

³*Courier of Statistics*, 1927, No. 2, pp. I-VIII.

always synthetic, his analysis always grasps the aggregate of a whole number of isolated factors. . . .

. . . When the uproar of Civil War started to subside and the Soviet society turned from revolutionary wars to revolutionary construction, the ideas of V. G. Groman began to attract attention and to make progress towards realization in life. When, shortly after the organization of the Gosplan, V. G. Groman had become one of its foremost workers, he at once started to develop statistical methods which would throw light on the national economy as a whole with all its manifestations. Thus came to life the statistics of current economic observations, thus developed *The Control Figures of the National Economy of the USSR*, and thus became visible the ways of planned statistical work, which now forms the basis of our economic policies. Undoubtedly, the idea of the balance of national economy is also his. Everybody who worked with him at this time or in later periods, knows well his ability to produce in all his collaborators that special enthusiasm which is the characteristic feature of all working units organized by Groman. . . .

In the Gosplan he organized the Council for Current Economic Observation and started to assemble scattered statistical studies of departmental and state statistics into something that makes sense. Thus came to life the first surveys of current economic observation and the first reports to the Soviet of Labor and Defense [STO] on the national economy. As is usual, many tried to imitate Groman. Bureaus for current economic observation were organized in each Commissariat; everybody who had leisure started to manufacture surveys of current economic observation. Groman himself made a further step and took an active part in the preparations of Control Figures, which now are the basis of all our planning. . . .

In this synthesis of planning and statistical work, for which Groman strove all his life, but which he could realize only after the October Revolution, in the epoch of active socialist construction, is the best characterization of V. G. Groman as a social scientist and thinker. Let us hope that now, when conditions for fruitful work in this field are at hand, V. G. Groman will start a new brilliant page in the history of his activities and will help to develop what he calls statistics of a national-economic total.

This fully deserved eulogy may be supplemented and modified to a certain extent. The idea of Groman as a thinker is, perhaps, overemphasized. Let us quote V. A. Bazarov, Groman's closest collaborator in the last and most important decade of his active life. The very title of Bazarov's article "Groman's Concept of the National-Economic Total and the Planning Principle"⁴ shows that on the vital point of handling the economy as a unit, Bazarov's appraisal was exactly the same as that of the editors of *Courier of Statistics*. But in the following characteristic, Bazarov introduces a note different from that of these editors and, in my opinion, more to the point: "V. G. Groman, as a brilliant artist in the sphere of

⁴*Planned Economy*, 1927, No. 6, pp. 162-165.

economics, possesses a spark of mysterious insight which by its very essence is untranslatable into the language of our economic discussion of scientific-methodological perception."

When, in 1916, Groman attacked the Constitutional-Democratic Party and its spokesman A. I. Shingarev for their ineffective ways of fighting inflation, it was not so much Groman's better knowledge or greater wisdom as that "mysterious insight" of which Bazarov spoke.

The picture of Groman would be incomplete without emphasizing his quite extraordinary scientific truthfulness. When Groman committed an error, he would not try to close his eyes to facts, or look for excuses. For him facts, the truth, were supreme. Once he realized his error, he would speak of it freely, would look for an opportunity to acknowledge his error to the person who may have pointed out to him the correct interpretation. Without this crowning feature he would never have commanded the prestige, indeed the adoration, which he enjoyed especially among his collaborators.

Groman was the son of a German father and a Russian mother. I always thought his buoyant energy came from his father. His lack of restraint, on the other hand, was certainly from his Russian mother.

The thirtieth anniversary of Groman's activities was in May, 1927. The "brilliant page," which the editors of the *Socialist Courier* had wished him, lasted only about a year. He continued to fight for another year. When the all-out war against the peasants was on, Groman had the great courage to address an open letter to the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense (the Gosplan, the center of Groman's activities, was a committee of the latter council) in the Moscow papers of October 10, 1929, in which he referred to himself as a "socialist who does not share the point of view of the Communist Party." Gorbunov, the secretary of Rykov, who was then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense, answered the letter on Rykov's orders. He correctly interpreted Groman's position as that of an adherent of the Second International.⁵

⁵P. E. Vaisberg, "Bourgeois Distortions in the Realm of Planning," *Planned Economy*, 1930, No. 1, p. 19. I could not find either Groman's letter or Gorbunov's reply in Moscow papers of all-Russian circulation. It is possible that they were printed in a local paper such as *Moskovskaya Pravda*. But Vaisberg had a responsi-

Groman's arrest followed. He was broken and was made the chief performer at the so-called Menshevik trial, March 1-9, 1931, with N. D. Kondratiev, the leader of the Narodniki opposition, as the star witness for the prosecution.⁶ I wonder how many planning enthusiasts in this and other countries have ever heard of this trial. Yet this was not a trial of men, but the triumphal burial of planning without force, of planning combined with freedom for the worker to take and leave his job, of planning which allowed for the small-scale enterprise and, to some degree, freedom of thought and expression, in short, the kind of planning which many Western enthusiasts visualize and want for their own countries.

One feature of the trial, minor on the surface, may be mentioned here. Throughout the trial, the court and the prosecutor addressed the accused by their last names. The accused themselves and the prosecution witnesses (there were no others) mostly called one another by the first, Christian, name and the patronymic, the usual polite form of address among Russians. At first it apparently occurred spontaneously. But as the trial proceeded, it seems to have become a deliberate policy. The persistence in referring to Groman as Vladimir Gustavovich Groman by the chief prosecution witness, Kondratiev, was indeed so great that it must have had the effect of a deliberate demonstration.

In his final summing up of the individual characteristics of the accused, Krylenko, the prosecutor, described Groman as "the leader," "the authority," "the organizer," "the man who enjoyed the greatest confidence."⁷ Krylenko was right; Groman was indeed a leader, an organizer, a man who enjoyed great confidence!

Several reasons combined to make it understandable that such a fearless fighter as Groman was forced to repeat the foolish "confessions" dictated to him by Stalin's henchmen. Prolonged angina pectoris (in 1923 a Berlin specialist gave him a year to live) and excessive addiction to liquor had much to do with this. More than thirty years of uninterrupted fighting for something, against somebody, not infrequently against everybody, also contributed. Furthermore, almost all the Narodniki of the opposition confessed and gave up the unequal fight when still not in jail. (I am far from blam-

ble position in the Gosplan and *Planned Economy* was the Gosplan's journal, so the authenticity of the letter itself and of the reply are beyond any doubt.

⁶*The Trial of the Counterrevolutionary Organization of the Mensheviks*, Moscow, 1931—the official stenographic report of the trial.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 355.

ing anybody; I have nothing but pity for them.) But the decisive factor in Groman's surrender may have been the hopelessness of seeing planning, his cherished child, being put to use for the oppression of the whole Russian people, and especially of the hundred million peasants, for aims exactly the reverse of what he wanted it to serve. Now, there was no more sense to living, to fighting; nothing made any great difference; one might as well comply with the henchmen's demands if this would bring the liquor which had become almost indispensable to him.

I may add that I was happy to work under Groman in the short time from July 1916 to mid-March 1917. In 1923, 1925, and 1927, Groman made trips to Germany where I lived at that time, and we spent much time together. The interruptions made it easier for me to realize the changes. In 1917, when we separated, he was a planning maniac, the more dangerous the bigger his abilities, the stronger his drive. Long before 1928, the end of his career, he was a wise statesman, of great value to Russia because of his superhuman energy, his infectious enthusiasm, and, last but not least, his honesty.

An editor, to whom I submitted a note on Groman, suggested that I censure him for having "confessed" at the trial. My answer is this: "I am proud that Groman adhered to the same social-economic philosophy that I do; I am proud that I had the opportunity to work under him; I am proud that I have the right to call myself a friend of Vladimir Gustavovich Groman."

Alexander A. Vasiliev: A Personal Sketch

BY MILTON V. ANASTOS

PROFESSOR ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH VASILIEV, known and loved throughout the Western world as the dean of Byzantinists and the most amiable of men, was overtaken by death less than a week after his return from a triumphant flying trip to Thessalonike, Athens, Istanbul, and Paris. He was almost 86 (having been born in St. Petersburg, September 22, 1867), and his friends had come to look upon him as indestructible. He once remarked that he never understood what a headache was. Except for a successful operation to remove cataracts from his eyes, he had had practically no experience with illness until the stroke he suffered in 1950. He remained vigorous and mentally alert to the very end of his life and leaves, among other things, as a testament to his imperishable freshness of mind, a notable paper on the iconoclastic decree of Yazid II (720-24), which he had almost completed before departing for Europe in April, 1953, and which will be published in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, No. 8.

He himself took pride in his longevity, and was greatly amused by the fact that fortune had enabled him to outwit the corporations from which he had purchased annuities soon after his arrival in America. According to the terms of these contracts, the insurance companies continued to make annual payments to him although they had long since paid off the whole of the amount which he had invested plus accrued interest. On one occasion, when he was about 84, after he had expressed some anxiety about his income if he should continue to live for another generation or so, a friend, then not quite sixty, said, "Vasiliev, if you live to be 120, I will support you." "Oh, no, you won't," Vasiliev replied tartly. "By that time you will be dead."

Vasiliev reached the highest academic posts in Russia before coming to the United States in 1925. After studying at the gymnasium in St. Petersburg (1880-87), he was graduated from the University of the same city in 1892, and there obtained the doctorate in history in 1902. He then taught at the University of Dorpat (1904-12), at

the Pedagogic Institute of St. Petersburg (1912-22), and at the University of St. Petersburg (1917-25).

In the United States he was professor of ancient history at the University of Wisconsin from 1925-39, visiting professor at Columbia University (1935-36), and Senior Scholar at Dumbarton Oaks, Harvard University (1944-48). From 1949 until the time of his death he was Scholar Emeritus. At Wisconsin he was a much beloved teacher with a wide circle of friends among students and faculty. He became acclimatized quickly and yielded to no one in abiding loyalty to Wisconsin, which remained his happiest and fondest home until he moved to Dumbarton Oaks, where he ended his days in tranquillity and contentment. Vasiliev never married, but he was by no means a misogynist.

While in Greece as official representative of Harvard University, Dumbarton Oaks, to the ninth Congress of Byzantine Studies (held in Thessalonike, April, 1953) Vasiliev had the satisfaction of hearing the warm and affectionate tribute paid him by the leaders of the Congress, who spoke of him as *l'incarnation véritable de l'empire byzantin*, and as the leading scholar in his field. He replied with sincere modesty, grace, and eloquence, which made a profound impression and captivated the hearts of all.

He wrote much on a great variety of subjects, as readers of the *Russian Review* are aware, in Russian, French, German, Italian and English.¹ Four of his books, *Byzance et les Arabes* (2 vols., 1935, 1950,

¹The two *Festschriften* issued in his honor, *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, 10 (1938), and *Byzantion*, 17 (1944-45), both contain detailed and impressive bibliographies of his publications, the former of which, prefaced by a biographical sketch, was prepared by Professor George Vernadsky (*op. cit.*, pp. 1-17), and the latter by Professor Peter Topping (*op. cit.*, pp. 439-46).

Since 1945 Vasiliev published the following: *Historia del Imperio Bizantino* (2 vols., Barcelona, 1946); *The Russian Attack on Constantinople in 860* (Cambridge, 1946); "Life of David of Thessalonica," *Traditio*, 4 (1946), 115-147; "L'entrée triomphale de l'Empereur Justinien II à Thessalonique en 688," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 13 (1947), 355-368; "The 'Life' of St. Peter of Argos and Its Historical Significance," *Traditio*, 5 (1947), 163-191; "Imperial Porphyry Sarcophagi in Constantinople," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 4 (1948), 1-26; "The Monument of Porphyrius in the Hippodrome at Constantinople," *ibid.*, 27-49; "The Opening Address to the First Congress of Byzantino-Slavo-Oriental Studies," *Byzantion*, 18 (1948), 217-221; *Byzance et les Arabes*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (*Corpus Bruxellense historiae byzantinae*, 2, Brussels, 1950); *Justin the First* (*Dumbarton Oaks Studies*, 1, Cambridge, 1950); "The Historical Significance of the Mosaic of Saint Demetrius at Sassoferrato," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 5 (1950), 29-39; "Hugh Capet of France and Byzantium," *ibid.*, 6 (1951), 227-251; "The Second Russian Attack on Con-

a revised version of a study originally written in Russian), *The Goths in the Crimea* (1936), *The Russian Attack on Constantinople in 860* (1946), and the *Emperor Justin I* (1950), were published between his 68th and 83rd years. His work is celebrated for its accuracy, objectivity, and thoroughness. Nevertheless, he avoided pedantry and achieved a style that was clear, informal, and marked by a certain latent humor. Like other members of the school of historiography in which he was trained, he concentrated upon political, military, and economic developments. He never devoted much time to intellectual history, and paid scant attention to literature, philosophy, science, or theology. His chief original contributions were the studies he made of the relation of the Arabs to Byzantium, and of the historical information to be gleaned from hagiographical texts. Perhaps his most important and most characteristic book, however, is his popular, but not undocumented, general history of the Byzantine Empire, recently put out in a new and revised American edition, which he had the pleasure of inspecting before his departure for Europe in April. This manual, which has appeared not only in Russian, French, and English but also, to his great delight, in Spanish (1946) and Turkish (1943), has had a great influence and has probably been responsible for introducing more readers to Byzantium than any other single book.

For all his learning, which was prodigious, Vasiliev was essentially a simple man. He took natural and unaffected pleasure in the amenities of ordinary living. Though a scholar, whose control of bibliography and subject matter was always, to use one of his own characteristic phrases, "most amazing," he loved life in all its forms. A gifted pianist with a scholar's knowledge of music, which he had studied avidly for several years, he spent many gay hours listening to radio and phonographic performances of opera, the score of which he followed meticulously. During these informal concerts, he often

stantinople," *ibid.*, 161-225; *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453* (2d English ed., Madison, 1952).

Reviews: Sirarpie Der Nersessian, *Armenia and the Byzantine Empire* (*Speculum*, 20 [1945], 491-94); G. Georgiades Arnakis, *The Early Osmanlis: A Contribution to the Problem of the Fall of Hellenism in Asia Minor (1282-1337)* (*American Historical Review*, 54 [1948], 183 f.); Werner Ohnsorge, *Das Zweikaiserproblem im früheren Mittelalter: Die Bedeutung des byzantinischen Reiches für die Entwicklung der Staatsidee in Europa* (*ibid.*, 411); Louis Bréhier, *Le Monde Byzantin*, Vol. II, *Les Institutions de l'Empire Byzantin* (*ibid.*, 55 [1949], 107 f.); Dimitri Obolensky, *The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism* (*ibid.*, 657); Ernst Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, 2 (*Speculum*, 26 [1951], 211-216).

acted the rôle of the conductor, for which he had actually had professional training in St. Petersburg, and always took pains to determine whether anyone in the assembled company, besides himself, could name the instrument with which the opera for the day began. He did not, however, confine himself to the classics, but enjoyed popular music as well, taking particular joy in Hollywood musical comedies and in the leading ladies of the American cinema, whose charms he never tired of praising.

He was an eclectic also in his attitude to the culinary arts, being endowed with the capacity for appreciating and enjoying the simplest, as well as the most esoteric, of dishes. He always ate and drank heartily, and mischievously delighted in overindulging in foods and beverages which he archly described as "against my diet." This gastronomic enthusiasm of his even led to a lively correspondence with a scholarly banker in New York, who once wrote to ask him about Byzantine caviar and mushrooms. Out of Vasiliev's playful researches on this inviting subject arose a warm friendship and many a gourmet's triumph, which he used to describe to us upon his return from New York with inimitable gusto.

Few scholars have traveled more widely than Vasiliev, who considered no land, no people, no culture as irrelevant or uninteresting. He had seen pretty nearly all of the world except for the Far East, although he knew the Pacific, the South Seas (notably the island of Samoa, in which he not only had a series of memorable adventures but also acquired the Polynesian name, Aretana), and Australia. He took many a zestful voyage to Central and South America, and knew the Near East, North Africa, and Europe probably as intimately as anyone before or since. He had visited far and wide in the United States and had devoted friends in practically every state in the Union. He was so fond of the Mississippi River that, for some ten years or so, he annually took the cruise from St. Louis to New Orleans, and even insisted on doing so on the eve of his first post-war trip to Europe. On board his favorite Mississippi steamer, he was the life of the party, and on each trip opened the festivities by dancing with the captain's mother.

He was particularly attracted by the informality and gaiety of Paris, but he was always pleased when the time came to leave and to return to the United States. Despite all that he had suffered at the hands of the Soviets, he never became embittered and always remained devoted to Russia, the land, and the Russian language. For many years his invariable opening gambit in conversations at

the receptions and meetings which he attended was to say, "Vasiliev is my name. Do you speak Russian?"

At the same time, however, he became an American citizen at the earliest possible moment (1931), entering without mental reservations upon his new nationality, in which he took great pride and of which he frequently used to boast. Once, when descanting upon the beauties of Paris, he was asked if he would not like to live in France permanently. "Of course not," he replied with some heat, "I am American." He took politics calmly, but was a firm, though unvociferous, Democrat.

On his way back to the United States from Istanbul on his last journey, he stopped for a few days in Paris. While there he apparently suffered a heart attack, which he carefully concealed from his friends. But in his diary, which he had kept faithfully ever since his arrival in the United States, he expressed the prayer that God might permit him to go "home, home, home, to my Grandma² and Dumbarton Oaks." His prayer was answered, and he rushed back to Washington as quickly as he could, even foregoing the long-anticipated pleasure of sojourning with his fellow epicure in New York. He arrived in Washington late Monday, May 25; the next day, he came to Dumbarton Oaks for a gala lunch, at which he was lionized, as usual, by his colleagues and Mrs. Robert Woods Bliss, co-founder with Ambassador Bliss of the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, who was in Europe at the time. He then took to his bed, and died very early Saturday morning (May 30), hardly a moment after the 500th anniversary of the fall of Constantinople (May 29, 1453), with whose history his name will forever be associated. A memorial service in the Orthodox Rite (in *Who's Who* he described himself as "Greek Orthodox") was celebrated in the Russian Chapel in the Washington Cathedral.

Modest, unassuming, invariably cheerful and optimistic, Vasiliev was a man without rancor or ill will. He was one of those rare characters who meet with instantaneous admiration and affection. It is inconceivable that anyone could have disliked him. The universe has known few such men, and is not likely soon to produce another.

²This lady, Mrs. Robert Van Valzah, the widow of a colleague at Wisconsin, and her family were his closest and best friends, upon whom he greatly relied. Mrs. Van Valzah unfortunately did not reach Washington in time to welcome Vasiliev before his death.

Book Reviews

KOHN, HANS. *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*. Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1953. 356 pp. \$6.25.

Professor Hans Kohn's new book, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*, is a massive work of impressive scholarship. In addition to the two hundred and fifty large pages of text, it contains another eighty-five pages of extremely interesting and well-arranged notes, a useful table of "The Slavs, 1950" classified according to nationality, number, religion, and citizenship, a chaotic bibliography, and an index. The author tells his story in three chapters which are entitled "Pan-Slavism and the West, 1815-1860," "Pan-Slavism and Russian Messianism, 1860-1905," and "Pan-Slavism and the World Wars, 1905-1950." The emphasis is throughout on ideas and the expression of ideas. Professor Kohn is concerned with the thinkers rather than the politicians, the beliefs rather than the membership of the various Panslav groups, the doctrines rather than the circulation of their different periodicals. Within the limits of his approach, the author achieves remarkable range and richness. Indeed, he discusses numerous writers of several countries and of virtually every Slavic tongue, including even the Lusatian. The Pan-Germans, the Panturanians, and the proponents of Magyarization are also brought in repeatedly in the manner that reminds one of a contrapuntal technique. In fact, although Professor Kohn has much to say about many prominent

and less prominent Russian thinkers, and although his study also includes an incisive analysis of Polish Messiahship and Polish Pan-Slavism, its greatest scholarly value may well lie in its discussion of the less well-known Pan-Slav movements within the Habsburg empire and just outside its borders.

The wealth of interpretation in the volume is second only to the wealth of fact. Professor Kohn, an old student of nationalism in its different forms, skillfully emphasizes the romantic origins of Pan-Slavism, its particular position in the total intellectual and cultural development of Europe, its irrational assumptions, and its dangerous implications. He also notes clearly the fundamental conflict between the aristocratic and conservative nature and policies of the Russian imperial government and the demagogic and radical Pan-Slavism, a point often forgotten nowadays. More debatable is the author's great stress on the advantages of the "Austrian solution" for the Habsburg Slavs if not for Pan-Slavism as such. Attractive as this argument might appear, it is necessary to remember that a truly free and a truly federal Danubian monarchy remained as much of a dream as a truly liberal Russia or a truly socialist Germany, and the Slavs had to face realities, not dreams.

The very richness of the content of Professor Kohn's book may account, at least in part, for a certain weakness in its structure. Professor Kohn's Pan-Slavism is inclusive rather than exclusive, broad rather

than precise. The reader meets a parade of "Pan-Slavs" of every conceivable kind culminating in Stalin himself. This last section on Soviet "Pan-Slavism," although fascinating reading, is the least satisfactory part of the book. The author recognizes that the leaders of the Soviet Union merely used Pan-Slavism for a time for purposes of their own quite alien doctrine. Why then should they have such an important position in a study of Pan-Slav ideology? A more discriminate selection and a more precise classification would also improve the treatment of some aspects of Pan-Slavism in the nineteenth century. In particular one regrets the loose and at times questionable usage of the term "Slavophile."

Errors of fact are few, and they are of minor importance. The people's republic was established in Mongolia in 1924 not 1921 (p. 218). Alexander Guchkov, the President of the Third Duma, was never the Mayor of Moscow (p. 196): this office was held for a time by his brother Nicholas. Georgia never had a Patriarch (p. 233). The name of Suvorov is spelled in two different ways and the references to him are not entirely satisfactory; notably, he did not subdue the Pugachev rebellion as stated on page 226, but arrived only towards its very end at the scene of operations. Contrary to the assertion on p. 104 there was no danger of the Russian "absorption by the Mongols." The Mongols themselves were rather quickly absorbed by some of the less important tribes inhabiting the Russian steppes. Michelet to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not likely that a Moscow aristocrat kept shouting "My God, save the Czar" as he was

being impaled by Ivan the Terrible (pp. 89-90). And there is no greater link between the hypothetical aristocrat and "the strange confessions of Stalin's communist victims" than between that same aristocrat and Cardinal Mindzenty or Mr. Vogeler.

These and other possible criticisms should not, however, obscure the value of Professor Kohn's new book. *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* is a rich and learned work. It is also humane and wise. One hopes that Professor Kohn will continue his distinguished contributions to the study of nationalism and of modern European history in general.

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY
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SLONIM, MARC. *Modern Russian Literature—from Chekhov to the Present*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1953. 476 pp. \$6.80.

This volume, together with Mr. Slonim's earlier book, *The Epic of Russian Literature*, provides a comprehensive survey of the history of Russian literature.

In the present volume, Mr. Slonim displays the same thorough knowledge of the subject, the same skill in arrangement and presentation, that characterized his earlier volume. One of the important features of Mr. Slonim's survey is that individual writers and literary schools are systematically related to the social and political life of each period he describes. In this respect, for the foreign reader, Slonim's history is more informative than Mirsky's "classic" survey of Russian literature, which although abounding in brilliant aesthetic judgments and insights, is weak in the exposi-

tion of the social and political background.

More than half of *Modern Russian Literature* is devoted to the pre-revolutionary period (234 pp.), the remainder to the Soviet period (201 pp.). There are chapters on major writers: Chekhov, Gorky, Blok and the Symbolists; chapters devoted to secondary literary figures; several chapters deal entirely with the social and political backgrounds (the populist movement; 1905 and its aftermath; the Revolution and Civil War; etc.); a small section of one chapter is devoted to the émigré writers whose literary careers are brought up-to-date.

Mr. Slonim's literary interpretations and evaluations of individual writers are, as a rule, judicious and sound. In one instance—that of Gorky—the author's estimate seems to the present reviewer over-idealized. Gorky was not the noble figure that emerges from Mr. Slonim's chapter; there was always in him a strong opportunistic streak which is especially strongly brought out in Gorky's recently published correspondence with the poet Khodasevich.

One gets the impression from Mr. Slonim's background chapters that he is a historical determinist. Thus, the February Revolution, he believes, was the result of a long pent-up discontent of workers, peasants and intellectuals—the war having merely delayed the final collapse which was inevitable. With the historical evidence available now, most historians outside of the Soviet Union, would not agree with this interpretation. Furthermore, although Mr. Slonim is well aware of, and has in fact surveyed expertly the exceptionally rich and varied developments in literature during

the last ten years of the Imperial régime, he fails to relate these to the social and political scene of the time. If the society was in the process of disintegration and everything was moving inexorably toward the final collapse, how can one account then for the remarkable upsurge of Russian creative genius which characterized the last decade of the Imperial régime?

Mr. Slonim is probably right in his pessimistic estimate of the émigré literature. Still, I think, it does not deserve the cursory treatment it received. Certainly such figures as the poet Khodasevich, the novelist Nabokov, and the brilliant essayist and philosopher G. Fedotov, deserve a better and more extensive treatment than they have received.

Soviet writers and the various stages in the government's control of literature since 1917 are adequately surveyed. Mr. Slonim is not very convincing, however, in his efforts to establish a continuity between Soviet literature and the nineteenth century classics. To be sure, Soviet literature, much like the nineteenth century literature, does deal with contemporary life, is pre-occupied with ideas and "messages," does subordinate technique to content, yet, the contrasts with the classics are far greater than the similarities. The essential qualities of the nineteenth century writers—their remarkable receptivity to ideas, their keen artistic appreciation, their broad human sympathy, their passionate search for ultimate answers—are conspicuously lacking in Soviet writers. Complete spiritual isolation and deadly uniformity is what characterizes Soviet literature of the last two decades.

The above are some general points which, I believe, could be

raised legitimately in connection with Mr. Slonim's very valuable survey of Russian literature.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Dartmouth College

Harvard Slavic Studies, vol. I. Edited by Horace G. Lunt. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953. 476 pp. \$6.00.

Through the Glass of Soviet Literature—Views of Russian Society. Edited with an Introduction by Ernest J. Simmons. New York, Columbia University Press, 1953. 301 pp. \$5.00.

These collections represent two complementary methods of Slavic studies in this country: one is oriented toward an historical analysis of Slavic culture, the other toward an interpretation, by means of deductions from all available clues, of life and thought behind the Iron Curtain.

The scope of the Harvard collection is broad. Geographically, its ten essays encompass a large part of the Slavic world: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Macedonia, Russia; in method, they include linguistic, historic, biographic, aesthetic, and literary studies; and chronologically, they range from the beginning of the Slavic community and its earliest literary productions—in Roman Jakobson's discussion of Slavic languages and Alexander V. Soloviev's examination of the influence of the *Igor Tale* on old Russian literature—to its latest incarnation in Macedonian literature, which is described by Horace G. Lunt. In between we have work on the seventeenth century—in Dmitry Chizhevski's elucidation of "one of the most beautiful works

of Czech literature," Comenius's *Labyrinth of the World*; on the nineteenth—in Wiktor Weintraub's interpretation of Mickiewicz's political views, in Otakar Odložilík's analysis of Czech society at the time of its political unification in 1848, and in Michael D. Petrovich's examination of Russian Slavophile attitudes to the Polish uprising of 1863; and on the twentieth, in addition to Mr. Lunt's contribution, in Milada Součková's outline of how Marxist theory was imposed on Czech literature, in Renato Poggioli's critical essay on Ivan Bunin, and in Hugh McLean's translation and edition of letters written by Gorky to Khodasevich from 1922 to 1925. Each of them, through erudition, or by presenting new material, or in freshness of interpretation, adds something important to scholarship.

The letters of Gorky are of great historic interest. In the first place, coming as they do from an obscure period of Gorky's life, they provide valuable new material for his biography; and in addition, through Khodasevich's comments, which Mr. McLean has appended in footnotes, they enable one to follow the ideological and temperamental differences that led the correspondents to a rupture of their friendship, in a way that throws light on the kind of discord which in modern times has split up the Russian intelligentsia into feuding camps. But indeed, most of these articles should stimulate further study or debate: Mr. Poggioli's very interesting definition, for example, of Bunin's art as "stoic realism," closest, outside of Russia, to the work of the Sicilian, Giovanni Verga, and in Russian fiction, unique in having been alone affected by the "Parnassian ideals of impersonality and impassibility";

or Mr. Jakobson's contention—based on a learned comparative study of Slavic languages—that linguistic, rather than aesthetic or philosophic studies, can illuminate the true nature of Slavism, and his dismissal of "realism" as a trait peculiar only to Russian literature of the nineteenth century, but by no means characteristic of Slavs as a whole.

There is, however, one aspect of this important book about which I cannot refrain from registering a protest. This is its method of spelling Slavic words in phonetic symbols, so that Pushkin becomes *Puskin*; Chekhov, *Cexov*; Czar, *Car*; etc. Now and then, to one's immense gratitude, such hieroglyphics as *Ajxenval'd* and *Mejersol'd* are deciphered in parentheses—which indicates, by the way, that the value of the system seems dubious even to its practitioners. When the English speaking reader, for whom the book is presumably intended, is obliged to retranslate *Bajron* into his own familiar Byron, might he not justifiably argue that it would be more logical to give him the whole text in this outlandish code? But then, the chances are, he would not read it at all, except under duress. Is it necessary to exact so much of even willing students for the sake of an attempt at accuracy that is, at best, utopian?

The second volume is a collection of six studies by students in the literature seminars of the Russian Institute of Columbia University and their director, Ernest J. Simmons. Mr. Simmons's introductory essay is a brief history of Soviet government controls of literature, which serves as explanation of and justification for this book's sociological method, one, that is, which

deals with literary productions not as works of art but as social documents. The articles that follow are concerned with: the position of women, and the attitude toward Jews in the U.S.S.R., as they are reflected in its prose fiction (poetry is left out of the volume); the use of the theatre as an instrument of pedagogy; official views of art and scholarship, and their application in the notorious case of Zoshchenko. All the contributions appear to have been based on sound research, which is clearly presented and honestly interpreted; and as a whole they assemble considerable evidence that sometimes—as in Bernard J. Choseed's "Jews in Soviet Literature"—brings to question, but more often serves to corroborate widely held opinions about Soviet life and thought, arrived at through sources of another kind.

HELEN MUCHNIC

Smith College

TOMPKINS, STUART RAMSAY. *The Russian Mind, from Peter the Great through the Enlightenment*. Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1953. 291 pp. \$4.00.

In the preface to this survey of Russian history, the author explains his approach to his topic: this is, he tells us, an analysis of Russian "group psychology." Further, Mr. Tompkins writes: "The present work carries the story down only to 1855. That year marks a clean break in Russian history and thought." If so, can the reader gather from this one section what the Russian mind means in general, and not just during the period stretching from the early eighteenth century up

to the nineteenth century "breaking point"?

A limited attempt to analyze a definite historical period in the life of a definite people is quite legitimate. But we cannot follow Mr. Tompkins when he states in his preface that such a slice of Russian history offers "some understanding of Russian ideas during modern times." He goes on to say that the material he has studied shows that "not everything in the Soviet system is drawn from the teaching of Karl Marx; some things are inherited." And this inheritance, the author believes, is a legacy of the old Moscow mind; an inheritance of State-idolatry, and of blind subservience to absolute power, today translated into Stalin-Malenkov idolatry. It is the existence in Russia of this "group-psychology" that Mr. Tompkins has tried to prove by his impressive documentation. But, it seems to us, the book misses its point for one single reason. Mr. Tompkins has worked in one direction only, and has not paid due attention to other and different trends in Russian intellectual history.

It is impossible in a short book review to take up the various angles of this case. But we may raise an issue when Mr. Tompkins asserts that Russia received "enlightenment" from the West *only*, and not before the eighteenth century. This is to ignore the Christian, spiritual, and humanitarian tradition, which stamped the Russian mind far more fundamentally than the "Third Rome" ideology, which is supposed to have determined Russian imperialism. We strongly feel that the Russian mind is not totalitarian or imperialistic. No matter what totalitarian rulers did or do to harness the Russian people, this people

above all seeks truth and justice. Nor is it correct to say that Russians knew nothing about private philanthropy, and exclusively trusted in State relief. One has only to read Tolstoy to discover how little the Russian mind believed in the State as a "benefactor." Mr. Tompkins mentions the influence of the Bible Society and of Freemasonry (imported from the West in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries), but he does not mention Tikhon of Zadonsk, the remarkable saint and humanist of that very same eighteenth century, whose entire life was dedicated to the preaching and practice of private philanthropy. Saint Tikhon deeply influenced Dostoevsky, and he is much more important than many other personalities of the "enlightenment" period mentioned by the author. On the other hand, Mr. Tompkins himself, in order to prove his point, has assembled quotations from every Russian writer of that time who denounced the evils of "group psychology," from Radishchev and Novikov to Pushkin. As it happens, these are among the most representative men in the history of Russian culture. Why, then, see in "group-psychology" the most characteristic expression of the Russian mind?

HELENE ISWOLSKY

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Бокк, М. П. *Vospominaniya o moem otse P. A. Stolypine* (Reminiscences of My Father, P. A. Stolypin). New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1953. 352 pp. \$2.75.

These reminiscences of the daughter of the eminent statesman who deeply engraved his name upon Rus-

sian history of the early twentieth century, will be useful to future historians desirous to understand the psychology of that turbulent era.

Stolypin became Minister of Interior in April, 1906. On July 11 of the same year, immediately after the dissolution of the First Imperial Duma, the Tsar appointed him Prime Minister. Those were stormy times. The country was in the throes of a fierce political and social struggle. Workers were striking; rioting peasants were seizing landed estates and setting fire to manor houses; terrorists were killing government officials, high and low, who had incurred their disapproval.

Stolypin fought the revolutionary movement with courage and ruthlessness. He was faced with two major tasks not easily compatible but equally urgent: the need to restore order and simultaneously to carry into effect the reforms promised by the Tsar in his Manifesto of October 17, 1905, without impairing the monarchy. At one and the same time it was necessary to introduce a new constitutional system, to establish a working relationship with the popular representatives of the nation, to carry out a series of reforms, and to put a stop to the revolutionary excesses and crimes. The task of suppressing the revolution was facilitated by the fact that the strength of the administrative machine had remained intact. What is still more surprising is the fact that the economic life of the country, far from being brought to a standstill, was entering upon a period of rapid development.

Stolypin was a man of intelligence, outstanding ability, and strong will. A monarchist, deeply devoted to Russia and to his sovereign, he yet was fully aware that

the representative system and the reforms connected with it were necessary to the preservation of the monarchy and of Russia's greatness. For a long time Stolypin's political opponents failed to understand this, constitutionalist, aspect of his philosophy. One of his most eloquent opponents in the Duma, V. A. Maklakov, in his book *The Second Duma* (written much later in exile) has provided a very subtle analysis of Stolypin's views. As a sincere advocate of popular representation, Stolypin was willing to collaborate with the Duma; however, his conception of the Duma's rights and duties was at variance with that of the representatives themselves, who considered that henceforth the monarch was to reign but not to rule. Neither the First Duma, where the Cadets played the leading part, nor the Second, dominated by the socialists, corresponded to the Premier's idea of a parliament with which the government might be able to cooperate. Stolypin failed to reach an understanding with the first two Dumas in legislative matters, and both sides were wide apart in all things pertaining to administration.

In his endeavor to crush the revolution, Stolypin set up a stringent system of courts-martial functioning without the usual judicial safeguards—the absence of which transforms the administration of justice into a ruthless instrument of retaliation used by the state against the defendants. This measure rightly aroused the indignation not only of the opposition but of general public opinion. To the flood of protests and reminders that the country needed not executions but reforms, Stolypin had one answer ready: "First pacification, after that, reforms."

This program failed to convince a Duma whose temper, and often vote, were swayed by the revolutionaries. Out of 514 deputies, 200 were socialists. The liberals, who on many issues disagreed with the socialists, were as uncompromising as the latter in their condemnation of martial law and their insistence on the enactment of the promised freedoms which, in their opinion, would in due course bring about "pacification." Stolypin, unable to come to terms with the Second Duma, dissolved it. He went so far as to have the bulk of the Social-Democratic Duma deputation arrested, tried, and deported to Siberia, on the charge that they were allegedly plotting an armed uprising. He proceeded then to make changes in the electoral law and at last, through the medium of the Third Duma, elected on the basis of the new law, he set about the task of introducing reforms.

The most important of these was the so-called "Stolypin Homestead Law" which entitled every householder to withdraw from the village commune and to receive from it a plot of land as his hereditary private property. Stolypin's law was well received by the peasantry. In every part of the country peasants began cutting their ties with the commune and setting up individual homesteads. Among the opposition, however, liberal and especially socialist, the emancipation of the peasantry from the grip of the rural commune aroused discontent and even alarm.

Maklakov in his book on the Second Duma, which contains much interesting material on Stolypin, points out that the Premier was considering further reforms, such as the introduction of a state system of social security as well as improved

labor legislation. He was not destined to carry out these plans. In the autumn of 1911, he was assassinated in Kiev during a gala performance given in honor of the Tsar who was visiting the city. The assassin, Bogrov, was simultaneously an agent of the Secret Police and a member of the terrorist organization of the Social-Revolutionary party. The ghastly scene of the assassination which took place before the eyes of a numerous audience and in the presence of the Tsar and his daughters, is reported by the author of the memoirs at secondhand, since she was not present.

It is not the author's purpose to give a record of the political activities of her famous father. Hers is the artless story, told with engaging simplicity and frankness, of herself and her family, of their easy and harmonious life at their beloved country estate near Kovno, later at Saratov, during her father's governorship there, and lastly in Petersburg, where he occupied the very top of the official hierarchy. Their way of life was that of the old landed gentry, for centuries the mainstay of the monarchy. And yet this same class had produced that opposition against which it was Stolypin's destiny to fight.

In describing some of the terroristic acts of 1905, M. P. Bock writes: "A new era was beginning—the era of the open fight against the imperial family. The grievous days began when we learned what it meant to worry day and night about father's life. This anxiety never again left us until his death. At Saratov in those days I would time and again rush out into the hall to see whether father's coat was there; and only having made sure that he

was safe at home, would I resume my own pursuits with some peace of mind."

The worst horror was still in store for the Stolypin family. When he became Prime Minister, the enmity against him assumed a tragic intensity. The government had placed a state-owned country house on the Aptekarsky Island at his disposal. For the sake of safety the grounds were fenced in with a high enclosure and encircled with barbed wire. The Stolypins were living, as it were, in enemy territory. Nevertheless, a month after Stolypin's appointment to the premiership, on August 12, 1906, the terrorists succeeded in setting off an explosion. A bomb of terrific explosive power was thrown into the house inhabited by Stolypin, his family, and a numerous staff of officials, clerks and servants. The hall where the bomb exploded was crowded with petitioners.

M. P. Bock has shown great literary tact in devoting only nine pages to this frightful event which hit her family hard; but her very restraint deepens the effect of her narrative.

The balcony where the two youngest children—Arcadi, aged 3, and five-year-old Natasha—were standing, was blown up into the air. The children were hurled together with the wreckage into the embankment. They survived, but the little girl had both legs broken and suffered atrocious pain. "The terrorists themselves," the author writes, "as well as General Zamiatin and the doorman, who had tried to seize them, were blown to pieces. Thirty more people were killed on the spot, not counting those who died in the following days of their wounds. The only room in the house that re-

mained intact was my father's study. Despite two closed doors between the study and the place of the explosion, the huge bronze inkwell on his desk was thrown up into the air and flung above my father's head, flooding him with ink. Among dozens of killed and wounded in all adjoining rooms and upstairs, father, by the will of God, had remained unharmed."

Scattered throughout the book are valuable insights into Stolypin's character and many details of social and family life. The last chapters contain some passages relative to important yet still unanswered questions: what was the Tsar's own attitude towards his Prime Minister? How far did he trust his political judgment? Were those obnoxious reactionary trends, which had such a disastrous influence on the fate of the dynasty, stronger than the authority of the shrewd and firm Premier, utterly devoted to his country? For a definite answer to these questions many data are still missing.

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KLINE, GEORGE L. *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*. New York, Humanities Press, 1952. 190 pp. \$5.00.

It is well known that there is much philosophic activity in the Soviet Union, but regrettably little is known in the West about the form and the content of that activity. Dr. Kline has performed a valuable service by translating and editing seven essays by Soviet philosophers, essays selected from very wide reading in relatively inaccessible pamphlet and periodical literature. All

the essays deal with Spinoza. The unity of theme thus secured is appropriate, since, as the author tells us, more attention has been given to Spinoza in the Russia of the last quarter century than to any other pre-Marxist philosopher with the possible exception of Hegel. (A bibliography of Russian articles and books on Spinoza running to some one hundred and fifty items, two-thirds Marxist, supports the point.) Students of Spinoza will find here much that is of interest. However, as Dr. Kline shrewdly observes, we may study with profit not only Spinoza in Soviet philosophy but Soviet philosophy through Spinoza. It is the light which these essays shed on recent Russian thought which makes the book of much wider interest.

In a long historical and critical introduction, we are informed that in the studies of Spinoza since the Revolution three major points of view have been represented. In the generation before, Plekhanov had urged the substantial identity of Spinozism and Marxism, indeed that Marxism is "a variety of Spinozism." In the 1920's this thesis, in the more moderate form of insistence on the historic continuity of Spinoza and Marx, was maintained by Deborin and his followers. In the meantime opposition to this reading of Spinoza had developed: the mechanists (represented here by Akselrod) emphasized the theological trappings of the Spinozistic system and hence the differences between Spinoza and the explicitly atheistic Marx. By the early 1930's both the "menshevizing idealism" of Deborin and the mechanism of Bukharin (who is, rather curiously, not mentioned) were out of favor; the new philosophic orthodoxy of

Mitin, Yudin *et al.* was established. The position of this third group was intermediate, both in general philosophy and in the interpretation of Spinoza: Spinoza was a materialist and an atheist, but irreducible elements of the theological world-view persisted in his thought.

What it is of even more interest and importance to note is that these points of view, as Dr. Kline describes them and as the essays illustrate them, share so much. Thus both Deborin and the mechanists, although the former rather more than the latter, insist that Spinoza is to be understood as an expression of the new economic order which was emerging in seventeenth century Holland; and Luppel, representing the more recent orthodoxy, says flatly that Spinoza's system was "the most grandiose expression of the temper of mind of the seventeenth century bourgeoisie." (p. 168) Again, both the Deborinites and the mechanists fail to recognize Spinoza's philosophy as the expression of a religious vision of the world which is a genuine possibility for the modern mind. Deborin says in effect that the great equation, *Deus sive Natura*, is merely a semantic transformation and that the real message of Spinoza is that God is not; Akselrod holds that Spinoza was "a deeply convinced atheist" who, because of a religious temper of mind, "transferred the feeling of religious worship to the universal order." (p. 75) Both fail to see that if the great problem of human life is to attain an abiding good, if knowledge is that good, and if this is found in the world which science explores, it is not unreasonable for Spinoza to call that world God.

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BERGSON, ABRAM. *Soviet National Income and Product in 1937*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1953. 156 pp. \$3.75.

This book is a laborious attempt to interpret Soviet statistics of national income and product for the year 1937 in terms of a method of analysis known as "national income accounting," which has been developed by the United States Department of Commerce in the last few years. Professor Bergson starts his study with a fairly long introduction in which the reasons for the selection of the year 1937 are given, together with various limitations regarding this study; it includes also a discussion of Soviet statistics in general, difficulties involved in handling them, and attempts by other economists to estimate Soviet national income. The next chapter is devoted to the composition of the Soviet national income in current rubles. Chapter 3 deals with the adjusted factor cost standard of national income valuation. Chapter 4 analyzes the Soviet national income at adjusted factor cost. Chapter 5 discusses economic implications of this study. It is by far the most interesting part of the study, particularly comparisons between the national income of the United States with that of the Soviet Union in 1937. In this connection, it may be pointed out that the significance of Professor Bergson's study would have been considerably enhanced if he would have presented the national income analysis of the U.S.S.R. for a period of years instead of only one year, 1937. It is to be hoped that such an analysis will be made in the near future. The remaining part of the book includes 7 appendixes containing details of Dr. Bergson's computations, and

Soviet economic data from which tables presented in the text have been derived.

The reviewer has certain reservations with respect to some statements made by the author, for instance, on p. 90: "There is hardly any doubt, however, that if all income recipients are considered, including recipients of unearned income in the United States, the inequality in the USSR would be less." This sweeping statement doubtless would be true if it referred to the decade of the twenties and early thirties. However, it is less true when related to the present time. All evidence shows that the inequality of income distribution in the Soviet Union has been rapidly increasing since the early thirties. On the other hand, income inequality in the United States has been rapidly diminishing since the thirties because of high estate and progressive income tax rates. There is a large body of high Soviet officials who, with their families, live in great luxury and whose needs are taken care of by the state, though their monetary incomes may be considered to be relatively low as compared to monetary incomes received by some Americans before taxes.

It is obvious that Professor Bergson has spent an enormous amount of energy, patience, and perseverance, and this study is proof of a lot of careful reading, thinking, and ingenuity on his part. But it is not easy to appraise this compact little book because unless one is well acquainted with the conceptual subject of national income analysis, the reader may be lost in the intricacies of the subject and the arguments about it. In this connection, it would seem that too much space

has been devoted in this compact study to Dr. Jasny's criticisms of some of Professor Bergson's previous studies dealing with this subject and of refutations by the author. Thus, it is the feeling of this reviewer that this technical study will, in all probability, be of interest to only a fairly small group of specialists who are equipped to follow and understand the author's reasoning behind the techniques used in this study and the meaning of what he has been trying to do.

It is also probable that if Professor Bergson could have explained in greater detail some of his concepts and could have given more reasons for some of the methods used, the study would have been clearer and more understandable and, thus, would have been of greater interest to the non-specialist. The inclusion of an index would have been advisable.

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